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MFN RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES: IS THE
TWO-DECADE OLD SYSTEM WORKING, OR SHOULD IT
BE REVISED OR REPEALED?
Taunya L. McLarty*
Most Favored Nation ('MEN") trade status has been a corner-
stone of U.S. trade policy since 1934, and it is extended to all
nations except those specifically denied MFN status by U.S.
law.' Since 1934, the United States has used MFN status as
leverage to further U.S. national security and foreign policy
goals, and on a few occasions, has used it as a tool to obtain
trade concessions.
After World War II, the emergence of the United States and
the Soviet Union as the world's superpowers led to chilled dip-
lomatic and economic relations between the two countries. In
response, Congress passed the Trade Agreements Extension Act
of 19512 to suspend MFN status for all communist countries,
which collectively were referred to as the Sino-Soviet bloc.
While other developed economies continued to trade with the
Sino-Soviet bloc during the Cold War, the U.S. tariff wall
blocked the import of many products from these countries and
caused the targeted countries to reciprocate with trade barriers
to U.S. exports. In balance, however, the U.S. economic position
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of Arkansas School of Law; LL.M., 1998, Georgetown University Law Center. The
author would like to thank Terrence P. Stewart, Esquire, of the Law Offices of Stew-
art & Stewart, Washington, D.C., and Professor at Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter, for his comments on drafts of this article. Also, the author is grateful for the
comments provided by James Odom, Legislative Assistant of Senator Ashcroft, and
appreciates the input of Vladimir Pregelj and Wayne Morrison, of the Congressional
Research Service. The opinions reflected in this article, however, are those of the
author and cannot be attributed to her employer or those that provided her with
comments.
1. When the United States affords MFN trade status to another country, it
treats the goods from that country with no less favorable treatment than the goods
from other trading partners.
2. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, § 5, 65 Stat. 73
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1994)).
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was strengthened worldwide because the United States was a
major force behind the trade-liberalizing rounds of negotiations
in multilateral fora that continued under the auspices of the
1947 General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").'
By the early 1970s, the United States was prepared to build
on the GATT's Kennedy Round of negotiations of the 1960s.
There was sufficient momentum in Congress to pass the Trade
Act of 1974,4 which authorized further multilateral negotiations
and set forth U.S. objectives for such negotiations to liberalize
world trade.5 Additionally, Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974
contained new guidelines for trade relations with communist
countries, also referred to as non-market economies ('WMEs").6
Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 intended to strike a balance
between what appeared to be sometimes competing inter-
ests-the promotion of free trade versus the preservation of
national security and foreign policy interests. The tension be-
tween these issues has invoked intense conflict between the
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT]. GATT was signed in Geneva, Switzerland, on Octo-
ber 30, 1947. Generally, GATT has had as a goal the enhancement of trade through
lower burdens on all GATT parties.
4. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2495 (1994)).
5. This authority was used by the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate the
Tokyo Round of Negotiations in 1979. The Tokyo Round was the seventh round and
produced several side agreements to GATT. Additionally, the Tokyo Round reshaped
the Anti-Dumping Code and concluded the first Subsidies Code. See GATT, THE TO-
KYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1979). It also resulted in other
agreements on customs valuation, government procurement, and technical barriers to
trade.
6. NMEs will have to be defined based on the structure of countries' trade and
investment regimes, not based on a former political classification. The U.S. Trade
Representative, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, and the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF") all have definitions of NMEs. The definitions
are almost identical, and most of them give the Soviet Union as an example:
Nonmarket Economy: Term used to describe an economic system in which
economic activity is regulated by central planning, as opposed to market
forces such as supply and demand. Economic factors, such as production
targets, prices, costs, investment allocations, inputs, and most other as-
pects of economic decision making, are executed in accordance with a na-
tional economic plan drawn up by a central planning authority. Charac-
teristic of the economic systems of the Soviet Union and most other com-
munist countries.
A PREFACE TO TRADE, USTR GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TRMS (1982).
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United States and the affected NMEs and has invoked debate
between past and current executive and legislative branches
Essentially, Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 gave the Presi-
dent the authority to restore MFN status to such NMEs if the
NMIE met a specified two-tier test on trade and freedom of
emigration, specifically: (1) completion of a bilateral trade
agreement between the NME and the United States; and (2)
compliance with freedom of emigration provisions by the NME.s
This article considers the Title IV requirements, which have
their genesis in the Cold War era, in light of the historical
events leading up to the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974,
and in the context of the legislative intent and interaction be-
tween Congress and the Administration during consideration of
the bill.
The effectiveness of Title IV is evaluated in light of its appli-
cation to several countries: some that satisfied the two-tier test
but at a later date had their MFN withdrawn again; some that
satisfied the two-tier test and are still under its application;
and some that were under the two-tier test but now have per-
manent MFN status. Because China has emerged as one of the
largest and fastest growing world markets, this article focuses
on Title IV's application to China in light of its application to
other communist countries.
Finally, this article examines, regardless of the geopolitical
map of the 1970s and regardless of what Congress intended in
1974, whether the Title IV two-tier test for MEN status can
serve a functional purpose of promoting or protecting goals that
are vital to current U.S. national interests. The substantive and
procedural legislative requirements for the negotiation, approv-
al, implementation, enforcement, and termination of trade
7. Directly in response to President Clinton's policy on China, which is subject to
the Title IV requirements, Senator Richard Lugar claimed that "[t]he Administration
is showing a poverty of imagination in its responses to the Chinese." A MAJORITY
REPORT OF THE SUBCOMI. ON INTL SEC., PROLIFERATION, AND FED. SERVS., SENATE
COMzi. ON GOV'T AFFAIRS, THE PROLIFERATION PRIMER 3 (Comm. Print 1998) (quoting
Missile Proliferation in the Information Age: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intl °
Sec., Proliferation, and Fed. Servs. of the Senate Comm. of Gov't Affairs, 105th Cong.
31 (1997)).
8. See Trade Act of 1974 §§ 402, 404, 405, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2431-2435 (1994)).
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agreements are often designed to promote and reinforce U.S.
economic objectives, national security interests, and foreign
policy goals. Whether such legislative requirements produce the
intended results must be re-evaluated periodically. This article
concludes that MFN treatment has been a useful tool in some
respects since 1974, and that Title IV, as currently applied, has
faults that were not foreseeable in the 1970s. Thus, this article
recommends alternative legislative tools for some U.S. goals
and considers new legislative ideas for others.
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR MFN TREATMENT OF
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
A. 1934 Grant of MFN to All Countries
The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 granted MFN
tariff status to all countries.9 Therefore, there is not a list of
countries that qualify for MFN status. All countries receive
MFN treatment from the United States unless a country is
statutorily disqualified. °
MFN trade status allows foreign countries to export to the
U.S. market at a certain level of tariffs. The United States
bases three different tariff levels for all importable goods on
three classifications of countries. Column 2 tariffs, the highest
level of tariffs, apply to countries denied MFN status." Col-
9. See Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1994)).
10. For purposes of comparison, the State Department lists 190 independent coun-
tries in the world, 62 dependent countries, Serbia and Montenegro, and Taiwan. See
Department of State Homepage (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http'J/www.state.gov/www/
regions>.
11. The Column 2 rates average 12.15%. See OFFICIAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION ORACLE DATABASE
(1997) (giving the trade weighted ad valorem tariffs, i.e., the percentage of tariffs
that are actually collected from U.S. imports from all trading partners within a par-
ticular column). The Column 2 average rates, or non-MFN average rates, however,
could be much higher as applied to a specific country. For example, the 12.15% would
be higher if the Column 2 rates were applied against a country from which the Unit-
ed States receives substantial imports of products that have a particularly high tariff.
China, for instance, based on its 1995 exports to the United States, would have faced
an average duty rate of 44.1% if it did not have MFN status and was under the
Column 2 rates. See The Costs to the United States Economy That Would Result
From Removal of China's Most Favored Nation Status, INTL BUS. AND EcO. RE-
156 [Vol. 33:153
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umn 2 tariffs were enacted at the height of the U.S. trade pro-
tectionist era in 1930. They have not been lowered since their
implementation. 2 General Column tariffs apply to MFN trad-
ing partners; General Column tariffs have been lowered over
time through the GATT rounds of negotiations. 3 Special Col-
umn tariffs apply to free trade agreement partners of the Unit-
ed States and recipients of the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences ("GSP"), the Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI"), and the
Andean Initiative.'4 Special Column tariff levels have also
been reduced over time.
B. 1951 Withdrawal of MFN From Communist Countries
Until 1951, the United States did not discriminate against
products from countries that became communist or countries
dominated by communism. The 1VIFN status of the Soviet Union
and all countries of the then Sino-Soviet bloc, however, was
SEARCH CORP. (June 1996). This 44.1%, however, would likely reduce over time due to
market forces in the United states. The demand for Chinese imports would decline
due to the sudden price increase in the products that had previously faced little or
no duty but, under Column 2, would face high duties. Most toys, for example, are
currently imported from China duty free, but if China lost its MFN status, Column 2
would impose tariff rates of 40% to 70%. See Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the Unit-
ed States, Chapter 95 (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http'//www.customs.ustreas.gov/imp-
exp/rulings/harmoniz/imdex.htm>.
12. See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
13. In the various rounds of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, these tariff levels have progressively decreased. Currently, they average
2.77%. See OFFICIAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INTERNATION-
AL TRADE COMMISSION ORACLE DATABASE (1997) (giving the trade weighted ad valo-
rem tariffs, i.e., the percentage of tariffs that are actually collected from total U.S.
imports from all trading partners within a particular column). Some of the NME
countries, which were not party to the GATT and are not members of the WTO,
obtain the benefit of these rounds of negotiations if they have MFN treatment from
the United States under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 because MFN status re-
quires the United States to afford them the same treatment with regard to tariffs
that the United States affords the WTO members.
14. Currently, they average 0.15%. See id. The United States has free trade
agreements with Canada, Mexico, and Israel. The GSP, CBI, and Andean Initiative
recipients are generally developing countries that receive preferential trade and tax
benefits, unilaterally granted by the United States, to diversify their exports and
increase their foreign exchange reserves, which is intended to accelerate their econom-
ic growth and development and decrease their dependence on foreign aid. See HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF
U.S. TRADE STATUTES 104-06 (Comm. Print 1997).
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suspended under the authority of the Trade Agreements Exten-
sion Act of 1951."5 This resulted in the United States imposing
Column 2 tariff levels, the 1930 rates, instead of General Col-
umn tariffs against imports from any communist country.
The 1951 suspension defined the U.S. policy for communist
countries until the mid-1970s. In 1974, there were nineteen
countries, including the former Soviet Union, that were denied
MFN tariff status.16
C. 1974 Reinstatement of MFN to Communist Countries
Congress kept the 1951 suspension of MFN status in place
through section 401 of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974." The
drive in Congress in the 1970s, however, was to liberalize glob-
al trade. This movement led to giving the President latitude to
restore MFN status to NMEs if they met certain conditions
under the parameters of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974.
Under the Title IV parameters, which involve a coordinated
effort of the executive and legislative branches, MFN status has
been restored to many former communist countries. Only six
countries are currently denied MFN status. 8 Even so, in 1974,
15. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, 65 Stat. 73 (codi-
fied as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1994)). Following World War II, the United
States also imposed export restrictions from the United States to communist coun-
tries. In 1948, the United States subjected all such U.S. exports to special licensing
procedures. See Special Report to the Congress and the East-West Foreign Trade
Board on Impact on U.S. Imports of Granting Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to Ro-
mania, USITC PUB. 734, A-1 (June 1975).
16. These countries included: Albania, Bulgaria, the People's Republic of China,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, parts of Indochina under
communist control or domination, North Korea, the Kurile Islands, Latvia, Lithuania,
Outer Mongolia, Romania, Southern Sakhalin, Tanna Tuva, Tibet, and the former
Soviet Union. See S. REp. No. 93-1298, at 201 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-571, at 79
(1973).
17. Trade Act of 1974 § 401, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2431 (1994)). Congress considered a bill similar to the 1974
Act the previous year, but it was folded into the 1974 Act. See H.R. 10710, 93d
Cong. (1973).
18. Still today, Afghanistan, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) do not have MFN status. Vietnam and Laos are currently
negotiating bilateral agreements. See The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States, General Note 3(b) (visited Feb. 9, 1999) <www.customs.ustreas.gov/imp-exp/
rulings/harmoniz/hrm3.html>.
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the Senate Finance Committee recognized that "[t]he United
States has lagged behind other non-communist countries in
expanding its trade relations with the communist world."' 9
II. 1974 Two-TIER TEST FOR RE-ESTABLISHING AND
MAINTAINING MFN FOR NMEs
The Trade Act of 1974 sets forth two prerequisites for MFN
tariff treatment to be restored to a communist country. Sections
404 and 405 of Title IV require that the country enter into a
bilateral commercial trade agreement with the United States
and that the agreement be approved by Congress. ° Addition-
ally, section 402, most commonly referred to as the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974,21 requires the
country to meet statutory freedom-of-emigration requirements
or receive a waiver from the President."
A. Bilateral Trade Agreement
Section 405(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the Presi-
dent to enter into a bilateral commercial agreement that grants
MFN treatment to a specific country as long as it is within the
U.S. national interest." Section 405(b) sets out the substantive
requirements of the agreement and how the agreement will be
enacted initially and renewed for three-year terms thereafter.'
19. S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 201 (1974). In fact, the United States's total trade
with East Europe, in the year that it was at its highest (from the time that MFN
was repealed in 1951 until the 1974 Act) still did not account for even 10% of the to-
tal trade of the free world with East Europe. See id. at 201-02.
20. See Trade Act of 1974 §§ 404-405, (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2434-2435 (1994)).
21. The Amendment was named after its two strongest proponents, Senator Henry
Jackson and Representative Charles Vanik. See infra Part IV (discussing the legisla-
tive history of the amendment).
22. See Trade Act of 1974 § 402 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432
(1994)).
23. See id. § 405(a) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(a) (1994)).
24. See id. § 405(b) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b) (1994)).
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1. Substantive and Procedural Requirements for the Bilateral
Trade Agreement
The substantive requirements of a MFN bilateral commercial
trade agreement are fairly minimal. The agreement must con-
tain a reciprocal grant of MFN status' and provide for intel-
lectual property protection.26 Also, because there are a few
statutory requirements that are designed to protect U.S. inter-
ests in trading with NMEs, the agreement must provide that it
can be terminated at any time for national security reasons or
for the protection of security interests."7 The agreement must
also include adequate safeguards against market disruption in
the United States from foreign imports.28 Furthermore, the
trade agreement is supposed to contain some level of commit-
ment by the parties to promote trade, for example, through
tourist offices, commercial officers, trade fairs and exhibits, and
trade missions.
A bilateral trade agreement should "provide for arrangements
for the settlement of [private] commercial differences and
disputes." ° Additionally, if there are disputes between the
United States and the NME, the agreement should have a
consultation mechanism.31 A method for formal, binding dis-
pute settlement, such as provided for in the World Trade Orga-
nization ("WTO") for its multilateral trade agreements, "2 is not
25. See id. § 405(b)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(1)(B)
(1994)).
26. See id. § 405(b)(4)-(5) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(4)-(5)
(1994). The protection includes patents, trademarks, and copyrights. The agreement is
also supposed to cover "industrial rights and process." See id. § 405(b)(6) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(6) (1994)).
27. See id. § 405(b)(2) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(2) (1994)).
28. See id. § 405(b)(3) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(3) (1994)). The
bilateral agreement must "include safeguard arrangements (A) providing for prompt
consultations whenever either actual or prospective imports cause or threaten to
cause, or significantly contribute to, market disruption and (B) authorizing the impo-
sition of such import restrictions as may be appropriate to prevent such market dis-
ruption." Id.
29. See id. § 405(b)(8) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(8) (1994)). The
requirement is generally to promote trade, and the activities listed are merely
nonbinding examples. See id.
30. Id. § 405(b)(7) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(7) (1994)).
31. See id. § 405(b)(9) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(9) (1994)).
32. See Taunya McLarty, GATT 1994 Dispute Settlement: Sacrificing Diplomacy
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a requirement. Congress must consider and approve the agree-
ment by joint resolution through a special "fast track" proce-
dure.3
3
2. Procedures for Three-Year Review and Renewal of the
Bilateral Trade Agreement
The initial term of the agreement is three years 4.3 After the
initial three-year period, the agreement can be extended for an
additional three-year term if:
a satisfactory balance of concessions in trade and services
has been maintained during the life of the agreement,
and ... the President determines that actual or foresee-
able reductions in United States tariffs and nontariff barri-
ers to trade resulting from multilateral negotiations are
satisfactorily reciprocated by the other party to the bilateral
agreement. 5
These three-year extensions do not require congressional
approval, and they are not subject to congressional disapproval.
The President merely has to make the aforementioned determi-
nation, and it is not necessary that he publish such determina-
tion.36
B. Jackson-Vanik Amendment
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 can
be satisfied if the President determines that the country is not
restricting its citizens' right to emigrate and renews such find-
for Efficiency in the Multilateral Trading System? 9 FLA. J. INTL L. 241 (1994) (dis-
cussing the 1994 dispute settlement procedures of the WTO in light of the 1947 pro-
cedures for GATT).
33. See Trade Act of 1974 § 405(c) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(c)
(1994)).
34. See id. § 405(b)(1) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(1) (1994)).
35. Id. § 405(b)(1)(A)-(B) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(1)(A)-(B)
(1994)).
36. See id. § 405 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435 (1994)).
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ing thereafter," or if he waives the emigration requirements
and sustains the waiver thereafter."
1. Substantive Requirements of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, section 402 of the Trade Act
of 1974, prohibits the U.S. government from extending MFN
treatment 39 to any country that:
(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emi-
grate;
(2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on
the visas or other documents required for emigration, for
any purpose or cause whatsoever; or
(3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or
other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire
of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.4"
For the President to waive these three requirements, he has
to find that such a waiver will promote substantially the objec-
tives of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.41 Furthermore, he has
to report to Congress that "he has received assurances that the
emigration practices of the country will lead ... substantially
to the achievement of the objectives" of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment.42
2. Procedures for Initial and Annual Review of Emigration
Policies
There are several key dates for compliance with the Jackson-
37. See id. § 402(a)-(b) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a)-(b) (1994)).
38. See id. § 402(c) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(c) (1994)).
39. See id. § 402(a) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1994)). In ad-
dition to MFN treatment, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment prohibits the U.S. govern-
ment from extending to a country in violation of the emigration provisions any U.S.
government credits, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees. See id. Also, the
United States may not enter any commercial agreement with such country. See id.
Another provision in Title IV denied these benefits to any country unless it cooperat-
ed with U.S. efforts to establish an accounting of all U.S. military personnel missing
in action in Asia. See id. § 403 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2433 (1994)).
40. Id. § 402(a)(1)-(3) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a)(1)-(3) (1994)).
41. See id. § 402(c) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(c)(1)(A) (1994)).
42. Id. § 402(c)(1)(B) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(c)(1)(B) (1994)).
162 [Vol. 33:153
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Vanik Amendment. The Trade Act of 1974 was signed into law
January 3, 1975. At that time, the President had the authority
to find that a nation was not violating the three emigration
requirements in section 402' or to waive the requirements of
section 402 for eighteen months until July 3, 1976.
44
If the President finds that a country is in compliance with
the provisions, he submits his findings to Congress with a re-
port about the country's laws and policies on emigration. There-
after, the President must make the same finding with regard to
that country every six months in order for MFN status to re-
main in effect.45
If, however, the President waives the section 402 require-
ments, the initial waiver lasts eighteen months.4' Thereafter,
the President has until thirty days before expiration of the
eighteen-month waiver to decide whether to renew the waiver
for twelve months by Executive Order.47 Thus, because a Janu-
ary 3rd, eighteen-month waiver would expire July 3rd of the
next year, the President has until June 3rd to renew the waiv-
er for twelve months.' The twelve-month waiver may be re-
43. See id. § 402(b) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(b) (1994)).
44. See id. § 402(c) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(c) (1994)). This
waiver authority was not in the original Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Re-
form Act of 1973. See H.R. 10710, 93d Cong. (1973). Rather, the communist bloc
countries would have had to comply with all of the freedom of emigration provisions.
See id.
45. See Trade Act of 1974 § 402(b)-(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2432(b)-(c) (1994)). For in-
stance, Russia initially received approval of its emigration policies in September 1994.
Thereafter, its policies have been reviewed by the President, and the President has
transmitted to Congress every December and June a statement that Russia's emigra-
tion policies remain in line with section 402(a) of the Trade Act of 1974. See, e.g.,
H.R. Doc. No. 104-154 (1995); H.R. Doc. No. 104-91 (1995); H.R. DOc. No. 104-12
(1994).
46. See Trade Act of 1974 § 402(c)(1) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §
2432(c)(1) (1994)).
47. See id. § 402(d) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d) (1994)).
48. Because the President may give notice that he will extend the waiver up
until 30 days before July 3, he is not bound to make that notification exactly on
June 3. Generally, though, the President issues an Executive Order around June 3.
The President must make his recommendation for extension of the waiver to Con-
gress "not later than 30 days before the expiration of such authority," and he must
include "a determination that continuation of the waiver . . . will substantially pro-
mote the objectives of [section 402], and a statement setting forth his reasons for
such a determination." Id. § 402(d)(1)(A)-(C) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432
(d)(1)(A)-(C) (1994)).
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newed by June 3rd every year, and it automatically goes into
effect July 3rd49 unless Congress by joint resolution 0 disap-
proves the waiver within sixty calendar days after July 3rd, the
day the waiver would expire but for a Presidential extension of
the waiver.5 If Congress does pass a joint resolution of disap-
proval by the deadline, the President can still veto the resolu-
tion, and the waiver goes into effect unless Congress overrides
his veto.52
MFN status accorded conditionally to a country remains in
force as long as the trade agreement remains in force and the
country complies with the freedom-of-emigration requirement or
the requirement is waived. Both of these elements of the two-
tier test have to be satisfied.53
III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TITLE IV OF THE TRADE
ACT OF 1974
It is essential to consider briefly the Cold War decades lead-
ing up to the 1974 Act because the foreign policy aspects of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment relating to freedom of emigration
target domestic policies of the Soviet Union developed before
World War II. Moreover, the economic and national security
aspects of the bilateral trade agreement concern the interna-
tional balance of powers at the conclusion of World War II.
49. See id. § 402(d)(1) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d)(1) (1994)).
50. Originally, either the House or the Senate could override the waiver with a
resolution of disapproval. However, after Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), which held that a one-House resolution override is in-
sufficient, the law was changed to require a joint resolution of disapproval. See Trade
Act of 1974 § 4032(d) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d) (1994)).
51. See id. § 402(d)(2) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d)(2) (1994)).
Congress can introduce a joint resolution for disapproval after the President transmits
his renewal of the waiver (June 3rd), but Congress must vote on the resolution with-
in 60 calendar days from the date the waiver expires (July 3rd)-which would be Au-
gust-31-or else the new 12 month waiver goes into effect automatically. See id.
52. See id. § 402(d)(2)(A)(ii) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d)(2)(A)(ii)
(1994)). The override must be by a two-thirds vote and must be done by the later of
the end of the 60 day period (August 31st), or 15 days after the President transmits
to Congress his veto message.
53. See id. § 402(d) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d) (1994)).
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A. Emigration Policy of the Soviet Union
Unlike in the United States, where human rights are inalien-
able, the former Soviet Union only recognized rights given to
the people from the government. While the Soviet Constitution
was redrafted four times since 1917, it never recognized a right
of emigration.54 Furthermore, Soviet law allowed for emigra-
tion generally, but the law did not specify any right of emigra-
tion or procedural safeguards for emigrant applicants.5
The practices of the former Soviet Union reflected this legal
deficiency. The country was known for periods of ethnic perse-
cution and attempted genocide, 5 which, for a variety of rea-
sons, had a disproportionately high adverse effect on the Soviet
Jewish population.57
During the era of Joseph Stalin, emigration was unthinkable
for Soviet citizens as individuals or groups. Stalin considered
the very thought of leaving the Soviet body politic an act of
treason."
The years of Nikita Khrushchev, however, presented more
practical, as opposed to ideological, problems. Emigration pro-
ceedings became an economic tool to extract high taxes from
the family of the emigrant applicant.59 Furthermore, Khrush-
chev used some individual's requests to emigrate as a foreign
54. See Sandra Drimak, Human Rights and the USSR Constitution, 2 TEMP. INT'L
& CoMP. L.J. 79, 80-85 (1988).
55. See Jeffirey Barist et al., Who May Leave: A Review of Soviet Practice Restrict-
ing Emigration on Grounds of Knowledge of "State Secrets" in Comparison with Stan-
dards of Int'l Law and the Policies of Other States, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 381, 429
(1987).
56. See Robert H. Bradner, The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of
1974: Soviet Progress on Emigration Reform is Insufficient to Merit a Waiver, 4 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 639, 642 (1990) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND INFORMATION
ON SOVIET EMIGRANTS: SOVIET JEWS 1 (1989)).
57. See Yaacov Ro'i, The Historical Link Between Soviet Domestic Developments
and Jewish Emigration, 53 JERUSALEM Q. 137, 138-39 (1990).
58. See id. at 138. Because of the Zionist movement, the Jewish population was
the most adversely affected ethnic group. See id.
59. See id. This tax affected Jewish applicants disproportionately because, as
compared with other emigrant applicants, Soviet Jews were often related to American
Jews that had wealth and influence. See id.
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policy tool during Arab-Israeli conflicts." Restrictions on emi-
gration were also used to protect what Moscow thought were its
national security interests during East-West tensions. The Sovi-
et officials did not want to approve many emigrant applications
because there was the fear that the 6migr6s, once gone from
the Soviet Union, would aid the Western enemies."'
After the United States recognized the Soviet Union in 1933,
the Soviet Union made economic reforms and adopted a new
"democratic" constitution in 1936.62 The positive U.S.-Soviet
relationship was, however, short-lived because of the ethnic
purges of the late 1930s.6"
B. National Security Concerns of the United States
Moscow's role in events at the beginning of World War II,
specifically, the Nazi-Soviet pact, the partition of Poland, the
bungled invasion of Finland (which made Joseph Stalin look
both brutal and incapable), and Stalin's assent to a non-aggres-
sion pact with Japan in April 1941, heightened U.S.-Soviet
tensions and compounded U.S. public perception "that the Sovi-
et Union was a cruel and rapacious dictatorship, only slightly
less repulsive than Nazi Germany."6
4
Adolph Hitler's June 1941 invasion of Russia came at a time
when U.S.-Soviet relations were strained. After the German
invasion, however, the U.S. State Department recognized that
"any defense against Hitlerism ... will hasten the eventual
downfall of the present German leaders, and will therefore
redound to the benefit of our own defense and security."65
The Roosevelt Administration thought that if the United
States and the Soviet Union were not able to cooperate after
the war, then "the world would be divided into two armed
60. See id.
61. See id. at 138, 139. Khrushchev thought this particularly true for Jewish
emigrants. See id. at 138.
62. See JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD
WAR, 1941-1947, at 3-4 (1972).
63. See id. at 4.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3-4.
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camps, a prospect too horrible to contemplate."66 Thus, Presi-
dent Roosevelt's "grand design" for military collaboration with
the Soviet Union to defeat Germany extended beyond the war,
and cooperation with Moscow was thought to be vital to ensure
postwar peace."
The President knew of the vast differences in U.S. and Rus-
sian culture and ideology, yet attributed Russia's hostility to-
ward the West as simply a lack of knowledge. Roosevelt stated,
"'I think the Russians are perfectly friendly; they aren't trying
to gobble up all the rest of Europe or the world .... They
haven't got any crazy ideas of conquest ....""' But by 1943,
Roosevelt realized that there was a real threat that Stalin
would attempt to dominate the postwar governments of eastern
Europe.69 The Soviet Union's emergence as a post-World War
II superpower then became the focal point of U.S. national
security.
C. Development of Roosevelt's Economic Policy as a Foreign
Policy Tool
During the early 1940s, when the United States viewed Rus-
sia as an essential element in the equation against Germany,
prospects for U.S.-Russian economic relations were positive.°
After World War II, the Soviet Union needed U.S. technology
and industrial equipment to boost production in its war-torn
economy. The United States, on the other hand, had been oper-
ating at a wartime production capacity too high for a postwar
domestic economy to absorb and needed to sell its products in
foreign markets. Russia's trade deficit with the United States
and lack of foreign exchange, however, stood in the way of its
ability to increase U.S. imports.
The Roosevelt Administration viewed the absence of interna-
tional economic cooperation as a major factor in causing war
66. Id. at 6.
67. See id.
68. Id. (quoting President Roosevelt, Speech to the American Youth Congress
(Feb. 10, 1940), in FDR: PUBLIC PAPERS, IX, at 93 (1941)).
69. See id. at 17.
70. See id. at 174.
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because an increase in trade barriers often has a parallel rela-
tionship to the rise of nationalism:
When ... the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was enacted [in 1930],
the countries of Europe ... raised their own tariffs, slapped
on quotas, adopted new-fangled methods of stopping trade
through import licensing and exchange control. Internation-
al trade broke down. Depression became worldwide. Busi-
ness collapse led to dictatorship in some countries, and
dictatorship has finally plunged Europe once more into a
costly war.71
Therefore, a major part of the Roosevelt Administration's
plan to ensure post-war stabilization was to ensure internation-
al economic cooperation. Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull, stated that "[a] world in economic chaos would be forever
a breeding ground for trouble and war."72 Secretary Hull's so-
lution to economic nationalism, which he considered to be a
cause of war, was to lower trade barriers worldwide:
To me, unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tar-
iffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with
war. Though realizing that many other factors were in-
volved, I reasoned that, if we could get a freer flow of
trade-freer in the sense of fewer discriminations and ob-
structions-so that one country would not be deadly jealous
of another and the living standards of all countries might
rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that
breeds war, we might have a reasonable chance for lasting
peace.73
The official position of the State Department was that inter-
national trade was foundational "to the attainment of full and
effective employment in the United States and elsewhere, to the
preservation of private enterprise, and to the success of an
international security system to prevent future wars."74 The
71. Id. at 20 (quoting Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, Speech, (Mar.
12, 1940)).
72. Id. at 18 (quoting CORDELL HULL, MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL II, at 1681
(1948)).
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id. at 22 (quoting STATE DEP'T, SUMMARY OF THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMM. ON THE RELAXATION OF TRADE BARRIERS (Dec. 8, 1943), reprinted in
POsTwAR FOREIGN POLICY PREPARATION 622 (1949)).
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Administration's international economic policy developed more
quickly than any other postwar policy, but it is important to
note that the policy sought to use trade directly as a carrot and
a stick to further other goals. It was not a policy based on the
notion that trade liberalization alone would indirectly create
more security in the world. While U.S. businessmen considered
economic relations with Russia an opportunity to access a "new,
virtually untapped field,"75  administration officials started
viewing it as "one of our principal levers for influencing politi-
cal action compatible with our principles."76
D. Use of Economic Relations as a Foreign Policy and National
Security Tool
At the end of the war, the United States considered extend-
ing Russia a sizable postwar reconstruction loan.77 Roosevelt
delayed approval for the loan several times stating that it was
"very important that we hold back and cjon't give them any
promises of finance until we get what we want."7" The admin-
istration wanted the U.S. loans to be a carrot to direct
Moscow's "'behavior in international matters."'79 Specific areas
of conflict included German repatriations and east European
self-determination." The changes were not forthcoming, howev-
er, and the loan talks failed.8 '
75. Id. at 185.
76. Id. at 189 (quoting Letter from W. Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to
Russia, to Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State (Mar. 13, 1944), in FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1944, IV, at 951 (1969)). W. Averell Harriman, U.S.
Ambassador during the war, was one of the most prominent U.S. businessmen during
the 1920s who did business with the Soviet Union. See THE FuTuRE OF U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS: TWENTY AmERICAN INITIATIVES FOR A NEW AGENDA 85 (Simon Serfaty ed.,
1989) [hereinafter TWENTY AMIERICAN INITIATIVES].
77. During the war, the United States and Russia had a mutual interest in the
U.S. establishment of a lend-lease program for Russia. The United States
strengthened Soviet cooperation and Russia secured U.S. credit to purchase U.S. mili-
tary and dual use items. After the war was over, however, U.S. Congressmen argued
that taxpayers should not finance Russian reconstruction. Thus, the United States
considered the loan options which would be required to be paid back within a speci-
fied time and on which the United States would earn interest.
78. GADDIS, supra note 62, at 191.
79. Id. at 190 (quoting Letter from W. Averell Harrimen to Stettinius (Jan. 6,
1945), in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1945, V, at 945-47 (1969)).
80. See id. at 174-75.
81. See id. at 175. The United States's intense effort to secure Russia's adherence
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In 1949, the United States, concerned about Russia's arms
build-up, formed the Coordinating Committee on Export Con-
trols ("COCOM"). This was an alliance of NATO members82 de-
signed to limit strategic exports to communist countries if such
exports could have a detrimental effect on members' national
security interests.83
As retribution for the Soviet role in the Korean War and as a
means to counter the growing threat of communism in the early
1950s, the United States further restricted economic relations
with the Soviet Union by withdrawing its MFN status." At
this point, the United States forewent any economic benefits de-
rived or foreseeably attainable through trade with the Soviet
Union in the interests of the U.S. strategy to contain the
spread of communism. After 1951, denial of MFN status for
communist countries was the general rule. The 1974 Act merely
allowed individual short-term reinstatements with periodic
reviews and renewals.
It is clear from the historical context of Title IV, that nation-
al security concerns of the United States play a major role in
the decision of whether to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement
with a communist country and the decision of whether to con-
sider terminating a bilateral trade agreement in part or com-
pletely. During the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet bloc was the
United States's enemy. The communist threat defined the need
for and scope of U.S. military build up and defense systems.
This pervaded many aspects of American society, including
trade relations. No other threat has risen to the level of the
threat posed by the collective force of the communist coun-
tries.85
to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and negotiation of lowered
trade barriers failed at this time as well. See id. at 22.
82. COCOM was comprised of NATO countries (except Iceland) and Japan.
83. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW
AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 159 (Comm. Print 1997). The United
States played a significant role in COCOM, but U.S. participation was not authorized
by U.S. law until the Export Administration Act of 1979. See id. at 158-59. COCOM
was relatively successful.
84. See TWENTY AMERICAN INITIATIVES, supra note 76, at 85. Also, U.S. loans,
such as those from the Export-Import Bank, were cut off.
85. Even countries such as Sudan, Syria, and Iraq still have MFN status because
all countries were granted MFN status in 1934, and they maintain that status unless
they are statutorily disqualified. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. There
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In 1958, Khrushchev attempted to discuss options for in-
creased economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the
United States by proposing the negotiation of a trade agree-
ment between the two countries.86 Although the original offer
was not accepted by the United States,87 it was renewed in
1964.88
Even though exports of the Soviet Union to U.S. markets
were inhibited because of the applicability of the 1930 Smoot-
Hawley tariff levels, during the 1960s, Soviet demand for U.S.
products such as agriculture, chemicals, and machinery, rose. 9
The trade volume increased between the two countries, but U.S.
exports to the Soviet Union accounted for only 0.2% to 0.5% of
total U.S. exports during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
This economic relationship cooled with Khrushchev's ouster.
As a result, U.S. businesses were unable to import many Rus-
sian-made goods at competitive prices. U.S. exports also were
subject to retaliatory Russian import tariffs. The Soviets were
quick to point out that the Soviet Union managed to conduct
twice as much trade with Finland than with the United States
and even more trade with West Germany."0
Trade relations expanded again in the 1970s during Leonid
Brezhnev's era of detente."' The Nixon Administration, specifi-
cally Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, viewed east-west trade
as a tool to encourage political reform in the Soviet Union. In
1972, the two countries negotiated a series of trade agreements,
are several countries, however, that the United States has embargoed all trade with
individually, so while they receive MFN tariff levels, they may not benefit from these
lower levels because the United States does not import their goods. For example,
commercial transactions with state sponsors of terrorism are prohibited. See
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 321, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332(d)
(West 1998). However, as a collective group of nations, the communist bloc is the
only category to lose MFN trade status.
86. See Harold J. Berman, The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement from a Soviet
Perspective, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 519 (1973).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See TWENTY AMERIcAN INITIATIVES, supra note 76, at 85-86. During the
Khrushchev era, there was some market decentralization, but the Kremlin withdrew
such reforms recognizing the inherent political discontent in economic reform. See id.
90. See Ronald D. Elving, The Sponsors: Jackson and Vanik, 47 CONG. Q. 3230
(1989).
91. See TWENTY AMERIcAN INITIATIVES, supra note 76, at 86.
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consisting of some sectoral agreements 92 and a general MFN
trade agreement. The MFN trade agreement could only go into
effect if the two countries granted one another reciprocal MFN
tariff treatment.93 The agreement, however, was renounced by
Moscow shortly after the United States passed the Trade Act of
1974 because Soviet government officials viewed the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment as a "flagrant attempt to interfere in their
domestic affairs."91
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought U.S. trade
with the Soviet Union to an abrupt halt. The Reagan Adminis-
tration adopted the position that, in addition to denying its
communist enemy sensitive technology, it would implement a
virtual trade embargo against the Soviet Union with the hopes
of bringing the Soviet Union to its knees.95
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE IV OF THE 1974 ACT
Title IV of the Trade Act of 1946 was passed with various
other titles. Overall, these titles attempted to strengthen the
economic position of the United States globally by liberalizing
world trade rules.9" In 1973 and 1974, several different addi-
tional proposals surfaced, including a Nixon Administration
proposal, 7 a House bill that favorably passed the House and
was sent to the Senate,98 and a Senate Finance Committee
version of the House bill that was passed in 1975 and is the
current law.99
92. They covered such things as maritime, grain, and lend-lease operations.
93. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Trade, Oct. 18,
1972, 11 I.L.M. 1321.
94. TWENTY AMERICAN INITIATIVES, supra note 76, at 85-86; see also Elving, supra
note 90, at 3230 (stating that the Soviets pulled out of the agreement because of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment); Secretary of State Kissinger Calls for Early Passage of
Trade Reform Act, 71 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 936 (1974).
95. See TWENTY AMERICAN INITIATIVES, supra note 76, at 86.
96. In 1973, the Nixon Administration requested the authority to begin a new
round of GATT talks and the authority to reinstate MFN status to communist coun-
tries.
97. See H.R. 6767, 93d Cong. §§ 501-504 (1973) (as introduced).
98. See H.R. 10710, 93d Cong. (1973) reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 571 (1973).
99. See H.R. 10710, 93d Cong. (1973), reprinted in S. REP. No. 93-1298 (1974) (as
amended by the Senate Comm. on Finance).
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A. Bilateral Trade Agreement
From 1973 to 1975, three points were made in the legislative
history regarding the negotiation and renewal of the bilateral
trade agreement that are of significance to U.S. relations with
communist countries, particularly with China.
1. Multilateral Versus Bilateral Trade Negotiations with NMEs
According to House Bill 6767, proposed by the Nixon Admin-
istration, the President would have had the authority to rein-
state MFN status if either the administration concluded a bilat-
eral commercial agreement with a country or the country be-
came a party to a multilateral trade agreement to which the
United States was a party, such as GATT."0 The House
passed a bill including the President's proposal to reinstate
MFN status under either the bilateral or multilateral arrange-
ment. The bill required Congress to leave the reinstatement of
MFN status to the discretion of the President, who would deter-
mine the status through whichever method "appears the more
appropriate."10
The Senate Finance Committee stripped the multilateral
trade agreement option. The Committee's new language re-
quired the President to negotiate a bilateral commercial agree-
ment with the communist country. This would produce an ac-
tion "intended to assure that the United States obtains appro-
priate benefits for itself, along with adequate safeguards in con-
junction with a grant of nondiscriminatory treatment." °2
Denying the administration the capacity to rely on multilater-
al negotiations with NMEs, such as with the Senate's treatment
of House Bill 6767, reinforces the opinion that the United
States maintains the best negotiating position when it uses
access to U.S. markets as leverage to obtain bilateral conces-
sions that will, in turn, maximize the export and foreign invest-
ment potential of U.S. companies. Additionally, it is less likely
100. See H.R. 6767, 93d Cong. §§ 501-04 (1973) (as introduced).
101. H.R. REP. No. 93-571, at 81 (1973).
102. S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 207-08 (1974).
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that the U.S. negotiating position in bilateral negotiations will
be diluted by the interests of other trading partners with sub-
stantially different export capacities and portfolios or will be
undermined by the willingness of other countries to acquiesce
prematurely on U.S. negotiating objectives outlined by Con-
gress.
2. Renewal of Bilateral Agreements With NMEs
The Senate Finance Committee changed the House's version
of the three-year renewal standard. The Senate version of the
bill also made it clear that the minimal elements required for
the approval of a bilateral agreement are much lower than the
standard for renewal of the agreement every three years.
Under the House version, the agreement could have been re-
newed if the foreign country maintained satisfactory conces-
sions. °3 The Senate determined that the review should be
based upon an examination of whether a country maintained a
satisfactory balance of concessions regarding both goods and
services. The Senate stated specifically that "it is of the utmost
importance that the United States receive, on a continuing
basis, mutual advantages" for both considerations."°4 Thus, by
requiring a "balance" and by adding "trade in services" as ele-
ments of the renewal of the agreement, the Finance Committee
raised the standard after the initial conclusion of the agree-
ment. The standard for renewing a bilateral agreement is high-
er than the standard of approving the agreement because the
standard of approving the agreement does not require a balance
of concessions nor liberalization of trade in services.
In addition to adding services to the renewal standard, the
Committee stated clearly that the three-year review procedure
would provide an opportunity for periodic review of the parties'
experience under the agreement, and that the agreement would
not be extended if the balance of trade was not adequate.' 5
The three-year review was intended to "afford the opportunity
103. See H.R. REP. No. 93-571, at 81 (1973).
104. S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 208 (1974). Among other things, the Committee noted
that services would include transportation, insurance, banking, and tourism. See id.
105. See id.
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to secure any adjustment needed to protect our interests."'
Congress never intended that MFN bilateral trade agreements,
as negotiated, would serve the test of time.
In addition to ensuring that the NME keeps up with U.S.
concessions, the renewal process also requires the NME's con-
cessions to keep pace with international norms. The renewal of
the agreement is conditioned on whether actual or foreseeable
U.S. multilateral concessions are satisfactorily reciprocated. °7
The Senate Finance Committee wanted to ensure that commu-
nist countries did not obtain a "free ride" on the next round of
GATT negotiations that were authorized in the Trade Act of
1974. '0 Presumably, the Senate also created this provision so
that concessions of the NMEs would keep pace with future
GATT rounds authorized in subsequent legislation.0 9
3. National Security in the Calculation of Trade With
Communist Countries
The national security exception of the MFN bilateral trade
agreement"0. must be considered in light of its historical and
legislative context as a whole. During the Cold War, the United
States attempted to use trade relations with communist bloc
countries as a tool to achieve non-trade related concessions.
Thus, obtaining market access, through tariffication of non-tariff
barriers and overall reduction of tariffs, was not the United
States's fundamental goal in its bilateral trade policy for com-
munist countries as conveyed in parallel multilateral trade
negotiations in the GATT."'
The legislative history of national security issues in the con-
text of the Title IV trade agreements shows that the national
security exception was an important factor in the passage of
106. Id. at 210.
107. See id. at 208.
108. The United States used the 1974 authority for the Tokyo Round of GATT
negotiations.
109. For instance, further "U.S. multilateral concessions" and negotiations were
authorized in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.), which allowed the
United States to participate in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. See id.
110. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
111. See infra note 250.
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the agreement. The Senate Finance Committee viewed the
national security exception to trade obligations, which must be
contained in all MFN bilateral trade agreements, as "especially
important in agreements with communist countries.""2 Fur-
ther, the Committee stated that encouraging aggression against
the United States or its allies would be grounds for termination
under the national security exception." 3
B. Jackson-Vanik Amendment
Each year, the annual debates on renewal of MFN take a
different focus. In recent years, this has especially been true for
China. While MFN status can be reinstated only if the substan-
tive language of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on emigration
is either met or waived, there are outstanding issues for evalu-
ation."' For example, one undetermined issue evaluates the
grounds on which MFN status can be revoked or the scope of
revocation. Two additional issues that often arise are whether
the amendment covers human rights in general or just emigra-
tion, and, if only emigration, whether the amendment was sim-
ply intended to target Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.
1. Human Rights Versus Emigration
Generally speaking, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment states
that its purpose is "[t]o assure the continued dedication of the
United States to fundamental human rights .... , "" The
amendment deals more specifically, however, with the emigra-
tion policy of communist countries. The U.S.-based Helsinki
Watch Committee ("Helsinki Committee") stated that "in spirit
the amendment transcends the emigration practice of a recipi-
ent country.""6 The Helsinki Committee would argue that the
amendment applies to human rights generally. Conversely, one
112. S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 208 (1974).
113. See id. at 209.
114. See Trade Act of 1974 § 402, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a)-(c) (1994)).
115. Id. § 402 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1994)).
116. REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., 99TH CONG., REPORT ON H.R. 3599: TEMPORARILY
SUSPENDING ROMANIA'S MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS 3 (1986) [hereinafter REPUBLI-
CAN STUDY COMM.].
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could argue that because freedom of emigration is considered a
basic human right," ' the preamble of the amendment merely
restated, in a more generic sense, the intent of the amendment
to protect this particular human right.
The sponsors of the amendment did not support the policies
of the executive branch. Senator Henry Jackson "was a critic of
every president from Eisenhower through Carter, charging that
they ... tried too hard to appease the Soviets.""' The legisla-
tive history of the amendment, however, shows that it was
intended to target the emigration policies of the former Sino-
Soviet bloc countries as opposed to human rights in general. A
Senate report states that the amendment is "to encourage free
emigration.""
Furthermore, emigration was the specific concern of the Sen-
ate sponsor in his communications with the executive adminis-
tration. The House bill did not provide the President waiver
authority, but Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, after lobby-
ing to eliminate the Jackson-Vanik provisions, obtained the
waiver."' Senator Jackson, a sponsor of the amendment, and
Secretary Kissinger exchanged letters regarding the require-
ments for a waiver,'2 ' and emigration was the only human
right discussed in their letters.'22
117. See G.A. Res. 217A(II1D, 3 U.N. GAOR at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprint-
ed in INTERNATIONAL HUmAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS: A COMPILATION OF TREATIES,
AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS OF ESPECIAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES 440.3
(Richard B. Lillich & Howard W. Smith eds., 2d ed. 1990) (stating that "[elveryone
has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country").
The Soviet Union was a member to this 1948 Declaration. See D. Mauntz Gustafson,
Comment, Soviet Human Rights Under Gorbachev: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 16
DENV. J. INTIL L. & POL'Y 177, 179 (1987).
118. Elving, supra note 90, at 3231. The sponsors of the amendment, Senator Hen-
ry Jackson and Representative Charles Vanik, '[bloth came from immigrant families
with little money." Id. Vanik represented a district having many Jewish constituents
whose lives under Communist rule led them to emigrate to the United States. See id.
119. S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 206 (1974).
120. See H.R. 10710, 93d Cong. (1973). The waiver provision was offered as an
amendment and received overwhelming support. See 119 CONG. REC. 40805 (1973).
121. See Letter from Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, to Henry M. Jackson,
United States Senator (Oct. 18, 1974), reprinted in S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 203-05
(1974); Letter from Henry M. Jackson, Senator, to Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of
State (Oct. 18, 1974), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 205-06 (1974).
122. See Mark H. Barth & Barry H. Nemmers, Note, Roadmap to the Trade Act, 8
LAW & POLay INT'L Bus. 125, 180 (1976). Kissinger outlined assurances he had re-
ceived from the Soviet Union regarding emigration. These included the following.
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The position that the amendment only applies to the human
right of freedom of emigration is supported by the actual lan-
guage of the amendment because the three benchmarks for
compliance with the amendment all concern emigration
policy.123
2. Emigration of Jews From the Soviet Union
Senator Jackson's letter to Secretary Kissinger, which con-
tained Senator Jackson's conditions for including the waiver in
his amendment, set, in addition to general requirements on
emigration, a benchmark specifying the number of Soviet Jews
that should be allowed to emigrate before granting a waiv-
er. 124
Some have speculated that the sponsor's "main intent was to
force the Soviets to let Jews go to Israel if they wished. The
Soviets had just imposed an 'education tax' on those with ad-
vanced schooling who sought exit visas."25 The decade after
the implementation of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment produced
statements that congressional concern was "over the Soviet
ending punitive actions against those who apply for authorization to emigrate;
eliminating procedural impediments to review of applications; agreeing to review ap-
plications based on when they were filed as opposed to the ethnicity, race, religion, or
residence of the applicants; expediting hardship cases; and agreeing to maintain diplo-
matic negotiations on emigration policy. According to Kissinger, these Soviet assuranc-
es qualified the Soviet Union for a presidential waiver of Jackson-Vanik. See Letter
from Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, to Henry M. Jackson, United States
Senator (Oct. 18, 1974), reprinted in S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 203-05 (1974).
Senator Jackson responded to Secretary Kissinger and stated his support to the
Kissinger points. Senator Jackson outlined additional requirements that should be
included in a waiver. These included eliminating criminal and civil actions against
those who apply for emigrant status, ending the requirement that the applicant's
family give its consent for the applicant to emigrate, and limiting Russia's use of
"state secrets" as reason to deny an emigration application. See Letter from Henry M.
Jackson, United States Senator, to Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State (Oct. 18,
1974), reprinted in S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 205 (1974).
123. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
124. Senator Jackson set a benchmark of 60,000 emigrants per year as the re-
quirement to grant the waiver. Senator Jackson intended this number to be a "mini-
mum standard" of compliance. See Letter from Henry M. Jackson, United States
Senator, to Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State (Oct. 18, 1974), reprinted in S.
REP. No. 93-1298, at 205 (1974); see also Alyson Pytte, Jackson-Vanik: A History, 47
CONG. Q. 404 (Feb. 25, 1989).
125. Elving, supra note 90, at 3232.
178
1999] MFN RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 179
Union's treatment of Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel."'26
The Senate Finance Committee noted at the time the amend-
ment was passed, however, that they intended the amendment
"to encourage free emigration of all peoples from all communist
countries (and not be restricted to any particular ethnic, racial,
or religious group from any one country)."27
V. APPLICATION OF TITLE IV TO COvMUNIST COUNTRIES
The Title IV statutory framework was designed in 1974 to
strike a proper balance between U.S. interests in light of com-
peting global powers at the time and domestic emigration poli-
cies of the Soviet Union that were abhorrent by U.S. standards.
In evaluating Title IV's application, one must consider whether
the statutory requirements for MFN restoration have been met,
and if they have, whether the framework, as applied to various
communist countries, has successfully or unsuccessfully promot-
ed and protected these U.S. interests. Thus, this section consid-
ers the application of the elements of Title IV's two-tier test,
the bilateral trade agreement (consisting of the substantive
requirements for negotiation and the procedures for renewal)
and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, to certain countries that
can demonstrate the elements' success or failure. Specifically,
this section evaluates the application of the substantive require-
ments of the bilateral agreement to Romania, China, and Cam-
bodia. The section then compares renewal process for Romania
and China. Finally, the section evaluates application of the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Soviet Union, Romania, and
China.
A. Bilateral Trade Agreements of Title IV Countries
Since 1974, there have been nine Title IV agreements con-
cluded with NMEs. 25 By way of comparison, four agreements
126. Pytte, supra note 124, at 404.
127. S. REP. No. 93-1298 (1974).
128. There were two Title IV agreements for Romania; a 1992 agreement replaced
the 1975 agreement. See infra note 131. In June 1990, there was one agreement
concluded for the Soviet Union, which, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
December 1990, was individually applied to the 12 former constituent republics. An
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are of particular note: the 1975 Romania Agreement, which was
the United States's first ever Title IV agreement; 2 9 the 1979
China Agreement; 30 the 1992 Romania Agreement, which, as
the second agreement with Romania, replaced the first; 3' and
the 1996 Cambodia Agreement, which is the most recent Title
IV agreement concluded by the United States.'32
All of the MFN bilateral trade agreements that have been
approved by Congress have met most of the minimal require-
ments of section 405 of the Trade Act of 1974.' Of particular
note are the areas where some of the agreements have exceed-
ed the section 405 requirements, either in the types and scope
of trade covered or in the level of commitments.
The agreement with Cambodia is the broadest and most
comprehensive. The agreement with China, even though it came
after the 1975 Romania Agreement, is by far the least substan-
tive. A House Ways and Means Committee Report stated that
China's agreement "is much less detailed and specific in terms
of concrete implementing measures or obligations to be under-
taken than the agreements with Romania and Hungary; rather
it takes the form more of a set of principles, concepts, and a
framework for nondiscriminatory bilateral trade relations."34
April 1990 agreement for Czechoslovakia was applied to the Czech Republic and to
Slovakia after their separation in January 1993. One of the latest agreements, con-
cluded in October 1996, was for Cambodia.
129. See S. REP. No. 94-281, at 1 (1975).
130. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 31 U.S.T. 4651 [hereinafter
1979 China Agreement].
131. See Agreement on Trade Relations Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Romania, Apr. 3, 1992, U.S.-Rem., Hein's
No. KAV 3709, Temp. State Dep't No. 93-219 [hereinafter 1992 Romania Agreement];
Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the Social-
ist Republic of Romania, Apr. 2, 1975, U.S.-Rom., 26 U.S.T. 2305 [hereinafter 1975
Romania Agreement].
132. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Cambo-
dia on Trade Relations and Intellectual Property Rights Protection, Oct. 4, 1996, U.S.-
Cambodia, Hein's No. KAV 5171 [hereinafter 1996 Cambodia Agreement].
133. See supra Part II.A.1 (outlining the requirements of the bilateral trade agree-
ments). The 1979 China Agreement, however, does not contain a specific provision on
safeguards. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
134. H.R. DOc. No. 96-209, at 7 (1979).
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1. Obligations
All of the agreements contain a reciprocal grant of MFN
tariff treatment for products.'35 The agreements with China
and Cambodia also provide for nondiscriminatory treatment
with respect to quantitative restrictions."6 Only the agree-
ment with Cambodia contains a provision on reciprocal national
treatment, patterned after the relevant GATT article."7
The greatest textual differences between the agreements
occur in their protection of intellectual property. Section 405
requires including in the agreements specific provisions that
protect intellectual property if the NME in question is not a
party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property and the Universal Copyright Convention.' The
United States is a party to both conventions.
At the time of signing the 1975 agreement, Romania was a
party to the Paris Convention but was not a party to the Copy-
right Convention. Thus, the 1975 agreement applied both con-
ventions bilaterally between the United States and Roma-
nia."'39 The 1992 Romania Agreement, in addition to these con-
ventions, made commitments on the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the Geneva Con-
vention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms. 4 °
When the 1979 China Agreement was signed, China was
party to neither of the conventions listed in section 405. The
1979 China Agreement fails to make specific reference to the
conventions or state similar obligations. It provides general
135. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. I, para. 1; 1992 Romania
Agreement, supra note 131, art. I, para. 5; 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at
4653; 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at 2306-07.
136. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. I, para. 2; 1979 China
Agreement, supra note 130, at 4654.
137. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. U.
138. See Trade Act of 1974, § 405(b)(4)-(5), Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codi-
fied as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(4)-(5) (1994)).
139. See 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at 2311.
140. The 1992 Romania Agreement contains 16 pages reaffirming the parties' com-
mitments to the substance of these agreements. See Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, Oct.
29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309.
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protection of intellectual property by stating a commitment to
existing laws, regulations, and international practice.'
Cambodia also was not a party to either of the conventions.
A major portion of the Cambodia Agreement, however, is devot-
ed to the protection of intellectual property rights and deals in
detail with intellectual property's various forms, definitions, and
operational aspects.'
There is a statutory requirement that agreements promote
trade, for example through tourist offices, commercial officers,
trade fairs and exhibits, and trade missions. All four agree-
ments contain provisions calling for general measures and
mechanisms to foster economic and trade relations.'
Specifically, all four agreements contain similar provisions
that call on the governments to establish, within the other
country, commercial offices for the promotion of trade and other
economic relations between the two parties to the agree-
ment.45 The two Romania agreements and the China agree-
ment also include provisions dealing with the legal and physical
establishment, operation, and personnel of firms from the other
country on MFN basis. These are considerably more specific
and comprehensive in the case of Romania than of China.'46
The agreement with Cambodia contains an undertaking to
foster economic and technical cooperation on a broad base,
141. See 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at 4657-58.
142. In the agreement, 12 out of 25 articles and 26 out of 33 pages concern intel-
lectual property. Separate articles of the agreement deal with the nature and scope of
intellectual property rights, obligations, and national treatment. Articles specifically
cover copyright, encrypted satellite signals, layout design of semiconductor integrated
circuits, trademarks, industrial design, patents, trade secrets, and acts contrary to
honest commercial practices. In addition to the rights discussed, the agreement ad-
dresses enforcement issues internally and at the border. See 1996 Cambodia Agree-
ment, supra note 132, arts. XI-XIX.
143. See Trade Act of 1974 § 405(b)(8).
144. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. V; 1992 Romania Agree-
ment, supra note 131, arts. III-V; 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at 4655-56;
1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at 2308-11.
145. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. V; 1992 Romania Agree-
ment, supra note 131, art. IV; 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at 4655-56;
1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at 2308.
146. See 1992 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, art. V; 1979 China Agreement,
supra note 130, at 4655-56; 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at 2308-11.
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particularly for the services sectors. 47 The second agreement
with Romania has a similar undertaking to achieve a mutually
acceptable agreement on investment issues. 48
2. Exceptions
Three of the agreements all include provisions about ade-
quate safeguards against market disruption from imports.
The 1975 Romania Agreement contains an annex with more de-
tail for the safeguards procedure. 5 ' The 1979 China Agree-
ment does not contain a safeguards provision as required by
Title IV, 5' but the Carter Administration reported to Con-
gress that the general provisions on consultations were intend-
ed to cover safeguards. 52
All four of the agreements permit either party to the agree-
ment to violate its obligations in the agreement if the measures
are necessary to protect the national security of a party.'53
The national security exception is spelled out in greater detail
in the Cambodia Agreement than in the other agreements.'
The 1992 Romania Agreement and the 1996 Cambodia Agree-
ment incorporate by reference the general exceptions contained
in GATT, Article XX.15  A country can adopt and enforce any
measures that are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health"56 or that are "necessary to secure compliance
147. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. VIII.
148. See 1992 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, art. IX.
149. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. IX; 1992 Romania Agree-
ment, supra note 131, art. X; 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at 2308.
150. See 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at 2317-18.
151. See Trade Act of 1974 § 405(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2435(b)(3) (1994)).
152. See H.R. DOC. No. 96-209 (1979) (citing the 1979 China Agreement, supra
note 130, at 4659; and also noting that section 406 of Title IV regarding market
disruption could be used).
153. The Romania and China agreements state: "The provisions of this agreement
shall not limit the right of either Party to take any action for the protection of its
security interests." 1992 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, art. XII; 1979 China
Agreement, supra note 130, at 4660; 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at
2314.
154. The Cambodia provision resembles the national security in GATT. See 1996
Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. XXIV; GATT, supra note 3, art. XXI.
155. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. XX; 1992 Romania Agree-
ment, supra note 131, art. XV; see also GATT, supra note 3, art. XX.
156. GATT, supra note 3, art. XX, para. 1(b), 61 Stat. at A1422, 55 U.N.T.S. at
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with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement."'57 Members have often tried to
use the GATT exceptions to restrict trade that they perceived
would have negative health or environmental impacts while the
challengers of those provisions frequently have viewed the mea-
sures as economic protectionism intended to protect domestic
producers against foreign competition.
3. Dispute Settlement
All of the agreements contain arrangements for the settle-
ment of private commercial differences and disputes. Specifical-
ly, the agreements suggest conciliation and arbitration.158 All
of the agreements require consultation,'59 and the three most
recent agreements provide for prompt consultations in matters




157. Id. GATT also allows an exception for measures "relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption." See id. And the General
Agreement on Trade in Services allows an exception for measures that are "necessary
to protect public morals or to maintain public order." General Agreement on Trade in
Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44, 58. The "public order" exception could be impli-
cated when a "genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the funda-
mental interests of society." Id. at 58 n.5.
158. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. X; 1992 Romania Agree-
ment, supra note 131, art. XI; 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at 4659-60;
1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at 2313-14.
159. See Trade Act of 1974 § 405(b)(3)(A), Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (cod-
ified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2436(b)(3)(A) (1994)).
160. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, arts. IX, XXVI (making a
commitment to consult on safeguards and a commitment to consult generally); 1992
Romania Agreement, supra note 131, arts. X, XIII (making a commitment to consult
on safeguards and a commitment to consult generally); 1979 China Agreement, supra
note 130, at 4658-59 (making a general commitment to consult on any problems that
arise); 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at 2308 (making a commitment to
consult with regard to safeguards but not containing a general obligation of consulta-
tion).
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4. Additional Provisions
Only the 1975 Romania Agreement and the 1979 China
Agreement indicate that the respective country is a developing
country.
161
Notably, the 1975 Romania, Agreement contains a provision
not mandated by section 405. This provision calls for a review
of the operation of the agreement by a Joint American-
Romanian Economic Commission aimed at making recommenda-
tions for possible improvements. 62
Under the terms of the agreements and in accordance with
section 405,163 the agreements enter into force upon the ex-
change of notes of acceptance by the two parties."6 They re-
main in force for an initial three-year term, and they are re-
newable for successive three-year terms unless they are termi-
nated by either party. 65 A party can terminate the agreement
before the end of a term as long as it gives thirty days notice
before the expiration of the term. 66 Also, a party can partially
or totally terminate the agreement if it lacks the domestic legal
authority to carry out its obligations under the agreement.1
67
For example, this may occur if the Jackson-Vanik waiver, is
revoked.
161. See 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at 4654; 1975 Romania Agree-
ment, supra note 131, at 2307.
162. See 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, at 2314.
163. See Trade Act of 1974 § 405(b).
164. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. XXV; 1992 Romania
Agreement, supra note 131, art. XVI; 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at
4663; 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, art. XII.
165. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. XXV; 1992 Romania
Agreement, supra note 131, art. XVI; 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at
4663; 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, art. XII.
166. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. XXV; 1992 Romania
Agreement, supra note 131, art. XVI; 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at
4663; 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, art. XII.
167. See 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. XXV; 1992 Romania
Agreement, supra note 131, art. XVI; 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at
4663; 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, art. XII.
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B. Three-Year Renewal Procedure for Title IV Agreements
The Senate Finance Committee, when reviewing the three-
year renewal process for MFN bilateral agreements, indicated it
would "afford the opportunity to secure any adjustment needed
to protect our interest."6 ' If the committee only wanted to
give the administration "the opportunity" to secure additional
concessions, it has done that. If, however, the committee intend-
ed for the opportunity to be used, it has not succeeded. With
one exception, no administration since 1975 has updated or
renegotiated any of the bilateral trade agreements like GATT,
which has gone through several rounds of negotiations."9
By way of example, one considers the renewal process for
Romania and China. Only the 1975 Romania Agreement has
been changed when, in 1992, the State Department negotiated
a new agreement. Otherwise, all of the three-year renewals
have amounted to a notice by the President published in the
Federal Register, using the section 405 standard of renewal.
For example, President Clinton recently renewed the 1979 Chi-
na Agreement stating:
I have determined that actual or foreseeable reductions in
United States tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade result-
ing from multilateral negotiations are being satisfactorily
reciprocated by the People's Republic of China. I have fur-
ther found that a satisfactory balance of concessions in
trade and services has been maintained during the life of
the Agreement of Trade Relations between the United
States of America and the People's Republic of China. 171
1. Romania's Renewal Process
As with Russia, MFN status for Romania was used more as
leverage to further U.S. national security and foreign policy
interests than as a tool to open markets. The 1974 Romanian
168. S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 210 (1974) (emphasis added).
169. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
170. Renewal of Trade Agreements With the People's Republic of China, 63 Fed.
Reg. 5,857 (1998) (statement of President William J. Clinton).
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Agreement was signed April 2, 1975, and became effective Au-
gust 3, 1975.'7' It was extended for three years for the first
time in 1978, by President Carter, 2 and then again in 1981,
1984, and 1987, by President Reagan."3
a. Importance of the Romanian Economy to the United States
Romania was an NME and never afforded U.S. businesses
the same access to its markets that Romanian businesses had
to U.S. markets. 74 By receiving MFN status from the United
States, Romania was also eligible for duty-free treatment for
certain exports under the Generalized System of Preferences
("GSP"), U.S. government credit guarantees from the Export-
Import Bank and Commodity Credit Corporation, and political
risk insurance from the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
tion ("OPIC"). 175
The United States benefitted marginally from Romania's
MFN status because, relative to the rest of the world, Romania
absorbed few U.S. exports, and if MFN status had been re-
voked, only a small amount of imports from Romania would
have been affected.'76 During the early 1970s, however, Roma-
171. See Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and
the Socialist Republic of Romania, Tariff Schedules Amended, Notice of Effective Date
of Proclamation 4369, 40 Fed. Reg. 34,651 (1975).
172. See Renewal of the U.S.-Romanian Agreement on Trade Relation-Findings
and Determination Under Subsection 405(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, 43 Fed. Reg.
25,983 (1978).
173. See Renewal of Trade Agreement with Romania, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,931 (1987);
Renewal of Trade Agreement with Romania and Hungary, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,025 (1984);
29,29921 (1981); Renewal of Trade Agreement with Romania and Hungary-Findings
and Determinations Under Subsection 405(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, 46 Fed.
Reg. 29,921 (1981).
174. See Juliana Geran Pilon, Why Romania No Longer Deserves to be a Most
Favored Nation, BACKGROUNDER-THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, June 26, 1985, at 4.
175. See also REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., supra note 116, at 5.
176. In 1985 and 1986, total U.S. imports from Romania were $881.3 million and
$579.2 million, respectively. The duty rate on nonpetroleum imports would go up from
the GSP and MFN rates to the full rates. This increase was, on average, 6% or 7%
up to 15% to 20%. The duty rate on petroleum imports, however, would remain below
one percent. Therefore, because about half of all U.S. imports from Romania were pe-
troleum products that would not have significant rate increases and about 7% of all
imports from Romania would remain duty free, the impact of revoking Romania's
MFN status would have had negligible effects on the U.S. economy. See Pilon, supra
note 174, at 4.
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nia was strategically important to the United States. Up until
1975, Romania was a net exporter of oil to the Soviet Union.
Romania exported as much as four million tons annually,'
and was, therefore, economically independent from the Soviet
Union.
In 1973, President Nixon and President Ceausescu met in the
United States and signed the U.S.-Romania Joint Economic
Statement ("1973 Statement").' 78 Due to Romania's emergence
as a developing country, the two presidents stated the impor-
tance of economic relations between their countries and made
commitments to go forward with economic cooperation."9 In
many ways, the 1973 Statement had the same foundation as an
MFN bilateral trade agreement, except that it did not actually
accord MFN tariff treatment. In the 1973 Statement, however,
President Nixon made a commitment to seek the authority to
provide MFN treatment to Romania, a commitment made prior
to the passage of the Trade Act of 1974."8° Thus, the 1974 Ro-
mania Agreement for MFN status was built on existing rela-
tions and was intended "to create a viable framework and fa-
vorable atmosphere for the development of trade and economic
cooperation."''
177. See id. at 3.
178. See Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation
Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania, Dec. 5,
1973, U.S.-Rom., T.I.A.S. No. 8,159, at 38 [hereinafter 1973 Joint Economic State-
ment].
179. Specifically, the Presidents stated that it would be advantageous for Romania
to be eligible for programs under the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation
and Export-Import Bank. See id. at 39. These programs, however, were not available
to those countries that had their MFN status withdrawn under the 1951 Trade Act.
Those countries could only be eligible for the programs if MFN treatment were re-
stored. See Trade Act of 1974 § 405(b), Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 2432(b) (1994)).
The Presidents also welcomed the conclusion of an agreement between the U.S.
and Romanian Chambers of Commerce, a Convention with Respect to Taxes on In-
come and Property, an Agreement Relating to Civil Air Transport, and an Agreement
Regarding Fisheries in the Western Region of the Middle Atlantic Ocean. See 1973
Joint Economic Statement, supra note 178, at 39-40.
Finally, the Presidents committed their respective governments to facilitate the
entering of private contracts between firms, the rights of companies to return and
repatriate capital, the avoidance of expropriation, the protection of intellectual proper-
ty, the settlement of commercial disputes, the exchange of commercial information,
and the economic cooperation by both countries through the newly-formed joint Eco-
nomic Commission. See id. at 40-41.
180. See 1973 Joint Economic Statement, supra note 178, at 39.
181. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and
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From the time of entry into the U.S.-Romania MFN Agree-
ment until the time it was being considered for renewal in
1978, the United States went from a trade surplus with Roma-
nia to a small trade deficit."2 In 1985, a House bill was intro-
duced indicating that the U.S.-Romanian trade deficit had
reached a ratio of 4.7 to 1." Romanian imports, however, had
not risen to a level that would cause a market disruption; nor
were Romanian imports being dumped in the U.S. market."M
b. Renegotiation of the 1975 Romania Agreement
Primarily as a result of non-trade related conflicts between
the United States and Romania, the two countries mutually
renounced MFN status in 1988. When the two countries began
diplomatic talks about a restoration of MFN status, the U.S.
Department of State wanted to negotiate a new bilateral trade
agreement broader in scope than the 1975 Romanian Agree-
ment, which met only the minimal standards of the Trade Act
of 1974. The new agreement was initialed April 3, 1992, and
submitted by the President to Congress for approval.'85 The
joint resolution for approval of the agreement failed to pass the
Means, 97th Cong. 43 (1979).
182. See U.S.-Romanian Trade Trends, chart, Tress. Papers 20 (Sept. 1976) (con-
taining excerpts of the Treasury Assistant Secretary Gerald L. Parsky's statement to
the Senate Finance Committee favoring the extension of the U.S.-Romanian Trade
Agreement) [hereinafter Tress. Papers].
183. See H.R. 3599, 99th Cong. § 1 (1986). From 1976 to 1984, U.S. exports to
Romania declined from $249 million to $206.5 million, while imports increased to
almost $1 billion, amounting to a $743 million deficit in 1985. See REPUBLICAN STUDY
COMNM., supra note 116, at 4.
184. As of the Fall of 1976,
ITihe U.S. International Trade Commission has received no petition or
request under Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 to conduct an inves-
tigation to determine whether imports of an article from Romania are
causing market disruption, nor has U.S. countervailing duty authority
been invoked against Romanian imports. The only case which has arisen
since Romania received MFN status is the issuance of an Antidumping
Proceeding Notice on Romanian clear sheet glass. The issuance of such a
notice, however, merely begins the formal investigative procedure and
does not necessarily imply a formal finding of dumping.
Treas. Papers, supra note 182, at 19-20.
185. The President also waived Jackson-Vanik for Romania. See Determination Un-
der Section 402(d)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended-Continuation of Waiver
Authority, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,005 (1993).
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House in 1992,186 but the 1992 Romania Agreement was ap-
proved in both the House and the Senate in 1993 and went
into effect.
8 7
While the executive branch pursued new negotiations with
Romania in the 1990s, the 1975 agreement would have been
sufficient to satisfy the two-tier test for MFN restoration. In
1988, only the emigration waiver was renounced by both par-
ties; this is separate from the validity of the bilateral trade
agreement.'
After Romania and the United States mutually revoked MFN
status in 1988, the bilateral trade agreement, by its own terms
and the terms of Title IV, remained in force. The agreement
states that if either party is unable to carry out its obligations
under the agreement, in other words, if the waiver under Title
IV is not extended, either party may suspend application of the
agreement in whole or in part. Neither the United States nor
Romania suspended the agreement. Granted, the agreement
was not of practical use to either party during the period in
which the two-tier test was not met, but presumably, if the
parties agreed to reinstate the Jackson-Vanik waiver, the agree-
ment would still be viable. In fact, President Bush renewed the
1975 Romania Agreement in 1990"89 even though the coun-
186. See H.R.J. Res. 512, 102d Cong. (1992). The House decided not to vote on the
resolution until after Romania's national elections, which took place October 11, 1992.
See H.R. REP. No. 103-279 (1993).
187. See Trade Policy Staff Comm. (TPSC); Notice of the Effective Date of the
Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the Government of Ro-
mania, 58 Fed. Reg. 60,226 (1993).
188. A report by the Republican Study Committee stated:
[The U.S. will apply MFN status to trade with Romania during the
period of the [bilateral trade] agreement as long as Romania complies
with the provisions of Jackson-Vanik, or failing that, as long as a waiver
is requested. If a waiver request is denied by Congress, the bilateral
agreement is automatically terminated.
REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., supra note 116, at 4. This statement, however, seems to
be inaccurate in two respects. First, the waiver has to be more than requested; it has
to be granted by the President. More importantly, U.S. law does not state that the
bilateral agreement is suspended if the conditions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment
are not met or waived. While MFN status terminates if the conditions are not met or
waived, the agreement is not terminated unless either or both parties terminate it or
let it expire at its three-year renewal term.
189. See Renewal of the Trade Agreement with Romania, 55 Fed. Reg. 27,797
(1990).
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tries had mutually denounced the applicability of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment, and President Bush did not extend a Jack-
son-Vanik waiver.
While a new agreement was not statutorily required, renego-
tiation was a logical step for U.S. trade negotiators for two
reasons. First, the 1975 Romania Agreement called for a review
of the agreement's operations. Second, presumably after fifteen
years of operation of an agreement, the parties are able to give
additional concessions. 190
2. China's Renewal Process
The United States and China re-established diplomatic rela-
tions in January 1979, signed a bilateral trade agreement in
July 1979, and provided mutual MFN benefits beginning in
1980.'"' President Reagan made the first renewal almost three
years later.'92 Over the last twenty years, the trade landscape
between the two countries has changed dramatically, but the
agreement has never been updated or renegotiated.
a. The Importance of the Chinese Economy
China's impact on the global economy, as well as the U.S.
economy, is astounding. China is also one of the largest and
fastest growing economies in the world and has become one of
the United States's most important trading partners.
Overall, China was only the twenty-seventh largest trading
country in 1978. Statistics in China show that from 1971 to
1996, however, GDP grew by an annual rate of about 8% and
11.7% in the last five years.'9 3 The International Monetary
190. See 1975 Romania Agreement, supra note 131, art. XI. The agreement speci-
fied that the review of its operations should be done by the joint commission estab-
lished in accordance with the 1973 Joint Economic Statement. See supra notes 178-80
and accompanying text (discussing the negotiation of the 1973 statement).
191. See Meeting Notice, 45 Fed. Reg. 6,662 (1980).
192. See Renewal of Trade Agreements With the People's Republic of China, 47
Fed. Reg. 57,653 (1982).
193. See DmECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOAHC STATISTICS 28 (1997).
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Fund ("IMF") estimates that China's economy could surpass the
United States's economy by 2007.
The Chinese economy was ranked as the thirty-second largest
U.S. export market in 1978 and the fifty-seventh largest export-
er to the United States. In 1978, U.S. exports to China were
$821 million, and imports were approximately $321 million.
This resulted in a $500 million U.S. trade surplus with China.
Presently, China is the fifteenth largest buyer of U.S. exports
and the fourth largest supplier of U.S. imports. In 1997, the
United States maintained approximately a $49.7 billion trade
deficit with China while the total U.S., trade deficit for goods
with the world was $198.9 billion.9 4 In 1996, the U.S. trade
deficit with China alone was about four times as large as the
U.S. trade deficit with the entire European continent, including
the European Union, Eastern Europe, Russia, and the newly
independent states ('NIS").
The disparities in the U.S.-China trading relationship stem
partly from the array of trade and investment barriers that
China has erected against foreign products. For more than 860
products, China has import standards that are often different
than international standards. China's import standards are dif-
ferent for no identifiable scientific reason, and they are often
not published.' China has an international trading rights
policy that restricts the types and numbers of entities within
194. See U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, U.S. DEP'T COM. NEWS 8,
19 (Feb. 19, 1998). These figures are for the deficits in products.
195. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1997 NATIONAL TRADE EsTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 43-59. (1997). These licensing practices cost U.S. businesses
more than $5 million per agricultural chemical. See id. at 49. For example, in 1996,
China banned U.S. poultry for reasons inconsistent with international norms. See id.
China still imposes punitive tariff levels against some of America's most
internationally competitive products, such as chemicals, while many of
our other trading partners give U.S. companies open access to their mar-
kets. Furthermore, when China does reduce tariffs on certain goods, it
repeatedly adopts new polices to undercut gains from tariff reductions.
For instance, in the early 1990s, China reduced the import tariff on U.S.
apples from 40 to 15 percent, but by 1996, China had erected new back-
door barriers on apples and other agricultural products that are more
damaging to U.S. exporters than the import tariffs.
Letter from John Ashcroft, United States Senator, to William Jefferson Clinton, Presi-
dent of the United States (Jan. 30, 1998).
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China which have the legal right to engage in trade, whether
import, export, or distribution.196
The disparities, however, exist also in part because the Unit-
ed States has not utilized sufficient leverage to have a signifi-
cant impact on the structural deficiencies in China, which is
still an NME.
b. Continuation of the 1979 China Agreement
In 1979, the Soviet Union was a greater security threat to
the United States than China, and establishing a foundation for
U.S.-China relations was viewed more as a foreign policy bene-
fit than an economic opportunity.'97 The reasons, however, for
initially extending MFN status and the lack of substantive
content of the bilateral agreement do not change the fact that
renewal of the agreement was not designed to be a process of
rubber-stamping the status quo for 20 years.
Specifically, the legislative history for the 1979 China Agree-
ment stated that the agreement was only "a framework for
nondiscriminatory bilateral trade relations obligating both gov-
ernments but yet to be worked out in specific measures and
procedures."9 '
In a letter to President Clinton, just prior to the 1998 three-
year renewal for the 1979 China Agreement, Senator John
Ashcroft questioned whether the standard for renewal in section
405 had been met:
This nearly two decades old agreement is woefully outdated
in comparison to other U.S. MFN bilateral trade agree-
ments that cover important sectors of the modern global
economy-sectors in which U.S. companies are very competi-
tive. Cambodia, for instance, committed in 1996 under its
196. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 195, .at 47. This international
trading rights policy particularly damages sectors like grains, cotton, vegetable oils,
and petroleum. The U.S. does not have such a policy.
197. See 36 CoNG. Q. ALmIANAc 357 (1980) (discussing the fact that members ap-
peared to have been more concerned with China's emigration polices and improving
U.S.-China relations as a method to counter the Soviet Union).
198. United States-China Trade Agreement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 7 (1979).
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bilateral agreement to treat U.S. imports like it treats its
own products and to give U.S. companies providing services
meaningful opportunities to compete-two commitments
China did not make in 1979. U.S. companies have proven to
be highly competitive in services sectors, such as banking
and finance, and the Asian economic crisis indicates that
China needs immediate competition and transparency in
these areas. There is absolutely no reason why the U.S.
agreement with China should be less comprehensive than
updated bilateral agreements with other non-market econ-
omies. The U.S.-China Agreement should incorporate, at a
minimum, those concessions China has made in its World
Trade Organization accession negotiations over the last ten
years. 199
When compared with other MFN bilateral trade agreements,
the 1979 China Agreement is much less comprehensive particu-
larly because it does not provide for national treatment.2 °0 In
light of the 1974 section 405 requirements, which are still the
law, the 1979 China Agreement is, however, substantively suffi-
cient on its face.20' After Congress approved the agreement,
though, the section 405 elements become irrelevant. The stan-
dard for keeping the agreement in place is the three-year re-
newal standard. The Senate Finance Committee indicated this
standard becomes higher as more concessions are made world-
wide for products and services.0 2
C. Application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Title IV
Countries
The President has determined that thirteen of the countries
that are still under Title IV are in compliance with the three
requirements for freedom of emigration for their citizens.0 3
199. See Letter from John Ashcroft to William Jefferson Clinton, supra note 195.
200. See, e.g., 1996 Cambodia Agreement, supra note 132, art. II (providing na-
tional treatment to products from the United States).
201. But see supra note 151 and accompanying text (pointing out that the 1979
China Agreement does not contain provisions specifically on safeguards).
202. See supra Part IV.A.2.
203. A full-compliance determination was made for Russia on September 21, 1994.
See H.R. Doc. No. 103-314, at 1 (1994). A full-compliance was made for Mongolia on
September 4, 1996. See H.R. Doc. No. 104-258, at 1 (1996). President Clinton found
that Albania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were
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He has waived the requirement with respect to two other
countries.204
Undoubtedly, it can be seen from the historical context and
the legislative history of Title IV that the Jackson-Vanik waiver
was largely put in place because of the Soviet Union's emigra-
tion policy. While Romania was one of the first communist
countries to obtain ]VFN tariff treatment, it has also faced
some of the most significant obstacles to the continuity of its
MFN status during the annual waiver procedure. Thus, an
examination of the United States's effectiveness regarding the
Soviet Union and Romania may demonstrate some problems
with current application of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,
specifically to China.
1. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment Applied to the Soviet Union
Following the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974, the Soviet
Union did not implement the provisions that Secretary
Kissinger conveyed to Senator Jackson."5 The Soviet Union
considered emigration policy a matter of its domestic policy and,
therefore, not subject to international negotiation.0 6 Thus, the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment was not waived.
Emigration levels rose and fell periodically over the course of
the 1970s and 1980s. The number of individuals allowed to
emigrate over the course of this twenty year period appears to
correspond with landmark events in U.S.-Soviet relations. The
in full compliance. See Presidential Determination Under Subsections 402(a) and
409(a) and 409(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended-Emigration Policies of
Albania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, 62 Fed.
Reg. 66,253 (Dec. 5, 1997). Also, the President found that Armenia, Azerbaijan, Geor-
gia, Mold6va, and Ukraine were not in violation of the emigration requirements. See
Presidential Determination Under Subsections 402(a) and 409(a) of the Trade Act of
1974, as Amended-Emigration Policies of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,017 (June 11, 1997).
204. China (including Tibet) is currently under waiver authority. See Determination
Under Section 402(d)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended-Continuation of Waiv-
er Authority, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,705 (June 3, 1998). Belarus is also under waiver au-
thority. See Determination Under Subsection 402(d)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
Amended-Continuation of Waiver Authority, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,709 (June 3, 1998).
205. See supra notes 122, 124:
206. See Secretary of State Kissinger Calls for Early Passage of Trade Reform Act,
supra note 94, at 936.
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number of Soviets allowed to emigrate rose significantly when
the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in negoti-
ations over the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, SALT I, in
1972 and SALT II in 1979. The numbers also declined sharply
in 1975 after the passage of the Trade Act of 1974.07 Secre-
tary of State Kissinger testified this was the immediate and
apparent effect of adopting the Jackson-Vanik amendment."'
Some commentators do not attribute the fluctuations to events
alone. Rather, some authorities attribute the increase in emi-
gration from the Soviet Union, especially in the early 1970s, as
a result of "quiet diplomacy."20 9
President Bush strongly supported the criteria in the Jack-
son-Vanik Amendment. In a foreign policy speech at Texas
A&M University, he stated, "should the Soviet Union codify its
emigration laws in accord with international standards and
implement its new law faithfully, I am prepared to work with
Congress for a temporary waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amend-
ment, opening the way to extend Most Favored Nation trade
status to the Soviet Union."210
President Bush's policy toward the Soviet Union, like Presi-
dent Reagan's, was trust but verify. In his speech at Texas
A&M University, President Bush clearly indicated that promis-
es for future action would be insufficient to obtain a waiver. By
1992, Russia had taken adequate steps to warrant a Jackson-
207. For the years 1968 through 1971, the total amount of Jewish emigrants from
the Soviet Union was 17,257. In 1972, the number of emigrating Soviet Jews to the
United States and Israel rose substantially to 31,681. It fell to 13,221 in 1975 and
rose to 51,320 in 1979.' During the mid-1980s, the number hit a low of less than
1,000, but by 1989, the number rose to 71,217. See Soviet Jewry Research Bureau,
Jewish Emigration from the U.S.S.R. (visited Feb. 26, 1999) <http://www.nesj.
org/stats.htm>.
208. Secretary of State Kissinger noted that just prior to the adoption of the
amendment, the number of emigrants had increased significantly, and the Soviets had
suspended the emigration tax. See Secretary of State Kissinger Calls for Early Pas-
sage of Trade Reform Act, supra note 94, at 936 (testimony as prepared for the Sen-
ate Finance Comm.).
209. Adlai E. Stevenson & Alton Frye, Time for Trade with Gorbachev, WASH.
POST, Apr. 23, 1989, at C2 (recognizing the apparent surge in emigrant applications
approved during START II, 1979).
210. President George Bush, Address at the Texas A&M University Commencement
Service (May 12, 1989) in 135 CONG. REc. 5259 (daily ed. May 12, 1989) (emphasis
added).
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Vanik waiver from President Bush.211 Since 1994, Russia has
fully complied with the amendment's emigration provisions.212
When viewed in light of a narrow objective of changing the
emigration policies of a country, as opposed to a general, ill-
defined standard on human rights, it is apparent that the Jack-
son-Vanik Amendment has served its sponsor's intent with
regard to the Soviet Union:
When the Amendment was enacted in 1974, the -Soviet
Union did not recognize the right to free emigration....
Jackson-Vanik was intended as, and served as, a pressure
tactic to compel a significant change in Soviet emigration
policy.... Looking only at the figures of Jewish emigra-
tion, the main concern and target of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, the former Soviet Union has surpassed that
benchmark in each of the past three years .... So we are
very pleased to note that, whether due directly to Jackson-
Vanik or not, the original goal of the Amendment has clear-
ly been fulfilled.1
2. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment as Applied to Romania
The United States waived the Jackson-Vanik amendment for
Romania in 1975.214 The United States used MFN status for
Romania first as leverage against the balance of power with the
Soviet Union1  and eventually as a tool to influence
Romania's own emigration and human rights policies.
The 1975 extension of MFN status to Romania was an effort
to "serve the foreign policy interests of both countries."216 The
United States, at the beginning of the Ceaucescu regime, want-
211. See Exec. Order No. 12,802, 3 C.F.R. 295-96 (1993), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. §
2432 (1994).
212. See Pres. Determination No. 94-51, 3 C.F.R. 1031 (1995).
213. Cold War Trade Statutes Affecting U.S. Trade and Commercial Relations with
Russia and the Other Successor States of the Former Soviet Union: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. On Trade of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 103d Cong. 19, 20
(1993) (testimony of Julian Spirer, Chair, American Jewish Congress).
214. President Ford issued the waiver. See Exec. Order No. 11,854, C.F.R. 987-88
(1971-1975), reprinted in 30 U.S.C. § 2432 (1994).
215. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
216. Recommendation for Extension of Waiver Authority, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 991 (June 7, 1976).
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ed to show support for Romania because Romania appeared to
be one of the few Eastern Block nations to display public inde-
pendence from Russia. Romania was sort of a "maverick in
foreign affairs."217 Specifically, Romania refused initially to
align with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
("COMECON") of the Soviet bloc. 18 Romania also refused to
permit Soviet troops on its soil for Warsaw pact exercises and
condemned Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia. Additionally,
Romania supported Yugoslavia's independence, sent athletes to
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic games despite a Soviet boycott,
criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and was the only
Eastern Bloc nation to maintain relations with Israel."9
U.S.-Romania relations, however, were not as positive in the
late 1970s and 1980s. During this time, there were repeated,
yet unsuccessful, attempts by Congress to suspend Romania's
MFN status.22 °
David Funderburk, the U.S. Ambassador to Romania from
1981 to 1985, testified before Congress that Soviet agents were
in Romania overseeing substantial exports to the Soviet Union,
that Romania was transferring western technology to the Soviet
Union, and that Romania had become a major exporter of
arms.221 Also, former Romanian Director of Foreign Intelli-
217. Pilon, supra note 174, at 2.
218. After it did join COMECON, Romania led the COMECON countries in its
proportion of trade with the United States. See Recommendation for Extension of
Waiver Authority, supra note 216, at 991. Romania was also the only COMECON
country that was a member of most of the multilateral financial and trade regimes.
Romania was a party to the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank,
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). Continuing Most-Favored-
Nation Tariff Treatment of Imports From Romania: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Trade of the Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong. 56 (1976) (statement of Gerald L.
Parsky, Assistant Sec. of Treas. for Int1 Affairs, favoring the extension of the U.S.-
Romanian Treaty Agreement).
219. See REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., supra note 116, at 5.
220. To ensure the continued renewal of MFN status, in 1974, President Ceausescu
set up a permanent task force, consisting of the Minister of Interior, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and Deputy Chief of Foreign Intelligence (Mr. Ion Pacepa). From
1976 to 1983, and again in 1986, congressional resolutions were introduced to disap-
prove the extension of MFN status for Romania. General Pacepa, after defecting in
1978, stated that "Bucharest is successfully outfoxing Washington day after day" with
its review of emigration cases just before MFN renewal, its financing of Romanian
emigree groups to demonstrate and lobby Congress, and its paying for hundreds of
books and articles to be published in the West about President Ceaucescu. Id. at 9.
221. See id. at 5.
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gence, Ion Pacepa, stated that "Mr. Ceausescu ... serves as a
conduit for the transmission of embargoed Western technology
to Moscow"222 and that "[e]very cooperative or joint venture
with Western companies is intensively used to infiltrate to the
West numerous intelligence officers and agents, for the purpose
of illegally obtaining Western technology."" Pacepa also
claimed that Romania supported international terrorism
through its "support of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion ... and the secret cooperation of the Romanian govern-
ment with the Libyan security forces."2
Particularly relevant to the annual renewals of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment was the fact that Romania continued to
"harass and oppress those who wish[ed] to emigrate."225 Al-
though Romania allowed emigration, emigration was not with-
out cost. The Ceausescu administration collected 10,000 marks
from each adult emigrant in return for exit papers and a ran-
som of 7,900 marks from the West German government for
every ethnic German emigrant. President Ceausescu was quoted
as saying "[w]e should make as much money as possible on our
vanishing natural resources-oil, Jews, and Germans."2 6 The
number of Romanian emigrants to the United States rose from
980 in 1975, to 4,545 in 1984, but many of those allowed to
leave Romania were reportedly "criminals 'dumped' on the Unit-
ed States, agents instructed to infiltrate the emigre community,
or dissidents forcibly exiled."2 7
222. Ion M. Pacepa, Ceausescu: America's Most Favored Tyrant, WALL ST. J., Jan.
13, 1986, at A26 (the author, Ion Pacepa, defected to the United States in 1978 after
being instructed by President Ceausescu to conduct secret assassinations of exiles
critical to the Ceausescu regime).
223. Ion M. Pacepa & Michael Ledeen, Rumania Reaps Rewards of Hi-Tech Thefts,
HUmAN EVENTS, Mar. 16, 1985, at 12.
224. Pacepa, supra note 222, at A26.
225. REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., supra note 116, at 7 (stating that "[diemotion or
dismissal from jobs, dismissal from universities, eviction from apartments, denial of
ration cards, and loss of citizenship are all common government responses" to a re-
quest to emigrate).
226. Id. at 8 (attributing this quote to President Ceausescu, as stated by General
Ion Pacepa, former Director of Romanian Foreign Intelligence). General Pacepa says
that President Ceaucescu engaged in what amounts to "selling Romanians" as an
export commodity. See Pilon, supra note 174, at 7. Ceausescu funneled money from
Israel and Germany for the "purchase" of Jews and Germans to personal accounts in
the Romanian Foreign Trade Bank and in Switzerland. See id.
227. Id. at 8.
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In 1982, President Reagan, through his request for an exten-
sion of the Jackson-Vanik waiver, warned the Romanian gov-
ernment that its MFN status would be in serious jeopardy in
1983 if there were not significant increases in Romania's emi-
gration."' President Ceausescu aggravated the situation with
a November 1982 announcement that the Romanian govern-
ment was considering a requirement that emigrants pay an exit
tax which would reimburse the government for the cost of the
emigrant's education." 9 President Reagan responded assured-
ly, stating his intention to terminate MFN status for Romania
as of June 30, 1983, if the tax plan was not abolished. The
education tax was canceled days before the deadline.' 0
Freedom of emigration was not the only human right dis-
cussed in the annual debate on the waiver of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment. The U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee stated that
"Romania is generally considered to be one of the most egre-
gious human rights offenders in Eastern Europe."21 ' In the
228. President Reagan pointed out that emigration to the United States had in-
creased. He stated, however, that:
I am gravely concerned about the Romanian Government's failure to
improve its repressive emigration procedures and the significant decrease
in Romania[n] Jewish emigration to Israel .... This emigration has
dropped from an annual rate of 4,000 prior to the 1975 extension of
MFN to Romania, to the current (1981) low level of 972. Furthermore,
contrary to the 1979 agreement with American Jewish leaders, Romania
continues to maintain a considerable backlog of unresolved long-standing
emigration cases. . . . Also, contrary to the 1979 agreement, the
Romanian Government has not improved its emigration procedures....
All these factors demonstrate Romania's negativistic emigration policy
which clearly contravenes the intent and purpose of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment ....
. . . I intend to inform the Romanian Government that unless a notice-
able improvement in its emigration procedures takes place and the rate
of Jewish emigration to Israel increases significantly, Romania'[s] MFN
renewal for 1983 will be in serious jeopardy.
H.R. Doc. No. 97-190 (1982).
229. See Pilon, supra note 174, at 8.
230. See id. The Romanian government simply started imposing back door bribes
that amounted to "a substitute for the Education Tax." Id.
231. REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., supra note 116, at 6 (citing Report to Congress,
U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee (May 14, 1985)). In its 1984 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices, the U.S. State Department stated that "[i]n the area of
human rights, major discrepancies persist between Romania's Constitution, laws, pub-
lic pronouncements, and international commitments on the one hand, and the civil
liberties and human rights actually allowed by the regime on the other." U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES,
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mid-1980s, Romanian authorities employed such tactics as beat-
ings, jailing, incarceration in psychiatric hospitals, torture, and
even political murder for those who tried to exercise civil liber-
ties, including freedom of expression. 2 Romania was often
cited for its violations of the basic human rights of certain
ethnic minorities, especially the Hungarians and unregistered
religious groups.
By 1985, commentators stated that Romania's lack of reform
and its abysmal human rights record "are a mockery of de-
clared U.S. policy goals." 3 Politically, MFN status for Roma-
nia only served to bolster the image of the Ceausescu re-
gime."' Economically, MFN status allowed Romania to keep
in place a centralized economy while benefitting from open
access to the U.S. market. 5
In the fall of 1985, nearly identical bills to suspend
Romania's MFN status for six months were introduced in the
House and Senate.2 The House bill cited reports from the
State Department, human rights organizations, and congressio-
nal delegations about accounts of arbitrary harassment, interro-
1077 (1984). Cf Juliana Geran Pilon, The Romanian Distinction Between Negative and
Positive Liberty, in 23 STUDIES IN SOVIET THOUGHT 131 (1982) (arguing, however,
that Romanian law, in its context, does not guarantee human rights).
232. See Pilon, supra note 174, at 5 (citing Amnesty International's Concerns in
Romania: Hearing on Human Rights in Romania Before the Subcomm. on Eur. and
the Middle East and on Human Rights and Int'l Org. of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 99th Cong. 76 (1985) (statement of Robert Sharlet, Consultant East European
Coordination Group, Amnesty International, U.S.A.).
233. REPUBLICAN STUDY COml., supra note 116, at 6 (quoting Former Ambassador
Funderburk from a 1985 press conference).
234. See Pilon, supra note 174, at 4 (noting that Ceausescu, by the mid-1980s, was
one of the Eastern block's most ruthless dictators and the only true Stalinist left in
power).
235. See id. at 4.
236. See H.R. 3599, 99th Cong. § 2 (1986) (sponsored by Representative Chris
Smith (R-N.J.), Representative Tony Hall (D-Ohio), and Representative Frank Wolf (R-
Va.)); S. 1817, 99th Cong. (1986) sponsored by Senator Paul Trible (R-Va.) and Sena-
tor William Armstrong (R-Colo.)). There were other bills regarding Romania's MFN
status. S. 1492, 99th Cong. (1986), sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), pro-
posed an outright denial of MFN status for Romania. H.R. 2596, 99th Cong., (1986)
sponsored by Representative Mark Siljander (R-Mich.), proposed denial of MFN status
if the Romanian government, in an effort to stifle the Hungarian minority in Roma-
nia, discriminated on the grounds of religious, ethnic, or cultural orientation. See
generally REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., supra note 116, at 1.
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gation, and arrest of Romanians who exercised civil liber-
ties. 37
In 1988, the United States and Romania made a mutual
agreement to renounce MFN status between the two countries
under the conditions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Thus,
Romania's MFN status was not extended that year and was,
therefore, ineffective as of July 3, 1988, when the President's
earlier Jackson-Vanik waiver expired.
In the early 1990s, the President and Congress took action to
renew Romania's MFN status. President Bush issued a new
Jackson-Vanik waiver on August 17, 1991,238 and the agree-
ment was subsequently waived annually until 1995.239 In May
1995, President Clinton determined that Romania was in full
compliance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment require-
ments.24 Since 1995, Romania has been granted unconditional
MFN status.24'
The House Report accompanying the bill to remove Romania
from the purview of Title IV stated various reasons relating to
trade, democracy, and protection of human rights for Romania's
restoration of unconditional MFN status.242 Romania had re-
mained in full compliance with the provisions of the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment for a year, approved a new constitution in
1989,' held democratic elections in 1991,2" and had imple-
237. See H.R. 3599, 99th Cong. § 1 (1986). The sponsors of H.R. 3599 focused
particularly on the lack of religious freedom in Romania. Officially, the country was
atheist, and citizens could only practice their religion in recognized sects. Human
rights organizations cited many incidents before Congress of others being harassed
and even persecuted. See id. (citing numerous cases of persecution). One case that
was particularly inflammatory in the U.S. press was the revelation that about 20,000
Bibles sent by the World Reformed Alliance to Hungarians in Romania were turned
into toilet paper-actual samples of the toilet paper, on which the words were still
visible, were displayed in Congress at a press conference. See id.; see also, Pilon,
supra note 174, at 2.
238. See Exec. Order No. 12,772, 3 C.F.R. 347 (1992).
239. See Pres. Determination No. 94-27, 59 Fed Reg. 31,105 (1994); Pres. Deter-
mination No. 93-25, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,005 (1993); H.R. Doc. No. 102-341 (1992).
240. See Pres. Determination No. 95-22, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,463 (1995).
241. See Act of Aug. 3, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-171, 110 Stat. 1539 (1996).
Romania's unconditional MFN status went into effect in the Fall of 1996. See Procla-
mation No. 6951, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,129 (1996). See infra note 313 for an explanation of
the importance of unconditional MFN status.
242. See H.R. REP. No. 104-629 (1996).
243. See id. Romania's constitution laid the foundation for a modern parliamentary
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mented significant reforms of its trade regime and financial
system.2"
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT USE OF TITLE IV
OF THE 1974 ACT
It is possible for some Title IV requirements to serve a func-
tional purpose of protecting and promoting goals that are vital
to U.S. national interests today. MFN treatment has been a
useful tool in various respects since 1974, but presently, the
United States faces different national security, foreign policy,
and international economic needs for the 21st century.
A. Protection of National Security Interests
National security concerns have often influenced U.S. econom-
ic relations. For example, for national security reasons, the
United States decided to refrain from pursuing economic cooper-
ation in the 1960s and 1970s when the Soviet Union sought
negotiations with the United States. The United States also
decided to pursue economic relations in the 1970s with Roma-
nia in anticipation of the passage of Title IV because of
Romania's economic independence from the Soviet Union. Fur-
thermore, for national security reasons, the United States ter-
minated trade relations with Romania in the late 1980s due to
repeated Congressional testimony that Romania's relationship
with the Soviet Union had changed to the detriment of U.S.
interests.
When using Title IV of the 1974 Act to protect and promote
U.S. national interests, one must first consider the issues of
whether there exists a threat that rises to a sufficient level to
democracy charged with guaranteeing fundamental human rights, freedom of expres-
sion, and respect for private property. See id. at 2-3.
244. See id. at 3. A new Parliament was elected in 1991. Id. at 3. Local elections,
parliamentary elections, and presidential elections were also held, and 1996 marked
the second nationwide presidential election. See id.
245. See id. Romania established a two-tier banking system, introduced a modem
tax system, loosened price controls, eliminated a lot of subsidies, adopted a tariff-
based trade regime, and implemented a rapid privatization of industry and nearly all
agriculture. Furthermore, Romania joined the WTO. See id. at 2.
203
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
upset U.S. economic relations and whether upsetting economic
relations furthers U.S. national security interests. In both re-
spects, these are factual determinations that should be made
every time the United States uses economic sanctions to further
U.S. national security.
Another issue to consider in the use of Title IV is whether
the United States should rely on a 1951 classification of "com-
munist country" or a 1974 categorization of "non-market econo-
my" to decide which countries the United States will grant
MFN status. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
normalization of relations with Russia, very few countries are
actually denied MFN status based on national security con-
cerns. The United States has not pursued MFN status for some
countries, such as North Korea or Cuba, because of national
security interests. The face of international threats, however, is
changing and state sponsors of terrorism, like Sudan, are more
of a menace to U.S. national security than many countries that
were formerly under the domination of communism, such as the
Ukraine. This is not to say that none of the countries currently
under Title IV presently do or could in the future pose a threat
to U.S. national security. Rather, this indicates that the 1951
classification has faults when applied today because there is no
longer a "bloc" of communist countries. Some of the countries
on the 1951 list are no longer a threat, and some countries
outside of the Title IV list are rising threats.
Finally, if the Cold War lines are erased and the United
States makes an MFN determination based on updated criteria
of what countries or alliances pose an actual threat to U.S.
security (in essence, making a Jackson-Vanik type procedure for
reviewing national security concerns), there is still the issue of
whether withdrawal of MFN status is the appropriate tool to
address national security concerns. Or, stated another way, are
there better ways to address national security threats around
the world?
It would not be particularly beneficial for Congress to estab-
lish "procedures" or "time-frames" per se to review the opera-
tion of a trade agreement in light of U.S. national security
interests for several reasons. First, the protection of U.S. na-
tional security is always an option; it does not need a specific
time to be reviewed or protected. If Congress was to designate
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a "time" to review U.S. national security, Congress may become
complacent to national security issues when it is not that
"time." Furthermore, simply because it is the appropriate "time"
to review U.S. security interests, multiple concerns that should
not rise to the level of threats may become exaggerated.
U.S. national security interests do not have to be defined in
advance by Congress to be protected. Nor does the review of
U.S. national security interests as they relate to a trade agree-
ment need to fit into any Congressionally-defined procedure.
Any U.S. trade agreement is unilaterally terminable by the
United States at any time to protect national security interests
regardless of when and under what terms the agreement speci-
fies for termination.
Most trade agreements actually state that they are termina-
ble for national security reasons. This is the case for U.S. trade
agreements that could raise significant national security con-
cerns and for those agreements that focus purely on the eco-
nomics of free trade. For instance, the U.S.-China Nuclear Co-
operation Agreement,"5 which covers sensitive technology and
was negotiated with a country with which the United States
has had proliferation concerns," arguably would be more fo-
cused on national security and less focused on the broad eco-
nomic benefits from trade than an MFN bilateral agreement.
Neither the agreement, which just went into effect, nor the
authorizing legislation," have annual or specified times for
potential termination of the agreement, outside its specified
246. See H.R. Doc. No. 99-86 (1985). The joint resolution that adopted the agree-
ment prohibited licenses to export or agreements to transfer nuclear materials, facili-
ties, or components to China under the agreement until after 30 days of continuous
session of Congress following the President's submission to Congress of certification.
See S.J. Res. 238 (1985) 99-183. President Clinton made this certification to Congress
on January 12, 1998. Pres. Determination No. 98-10 (1998), reprinted in H. DOC. No.
105-197 (1998). The 30 days of continuous session ended March 19, 1998, and the
prohibition on licenses was lifted. See Michael Kelly, Certifying China's Proliferation,
WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1998, at A20.
247. "China was ... the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technol-
ogy to Pakistan, and a key supplier to Iran during this reporting period [July-Decem-
ber 1996]." DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, THE ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY
RELATING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNI-
TIONS 5 (June 1997).
248. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 68-703, § 123, 68 Stat. 921, 940
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1994)).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:153
thirty-year lifespan, because such interim termination times are
unnecessary. Congress set out the standards for termination,
which could apply any time China takes an action rising to the
level of a threat.249
The United States is also able to protect sufficiently its na-
tional security interests with regard to its participation in the
WTO multilateral agreements, such as GATT and GATS. These
agreements, when compared with a nuclear cooperation agree-
ment or a MFN bilateral agreement, are much more economic
oriented."' The GATT national security exception, which al-
lows a WTO member to ensure that it does not compromise its
essential security interests,25' "is so broad, self-judging, and
ambiguous" that it essentially can be used for whatever a coun-
try desires.252
Another reason an annual review of national security in light
of MFN status would not be beneficial is because many of the
249. See id.
250. This economic orientation of the WTO agreements is reflected in the authoriz-
ing legislation for the Uruguay Round of negotiations. The principal trade negotiating
objectives of the United States in 1988, were to obtain:
(1) more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access;
(2) the reduction or elimination of barriers and other trade-distort-
ing policies and practices; and
(3) a more effective system of international trading disciplines and
procedures.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1101(a), 102
Stat. 1107, 1121 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (1994)) [hereinafter
OTCA]. Furthermore, this economic orientation is clear from the GATT agreement
itself. The GATT preamble states that its purpose is: "entering into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce." GATT, supra note 3, 61 Stat. at All, 55 U.N.T.S. at 194.
The GATS has a similar provision. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex
IB, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994).
251. See GATT, supra note 3, 61 Stat. at A63, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266.
252. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 204 (1989) (citing an instance in which a country
claimed that it had to maintain restrictive measures for shoe facilities because 'an
army must have shoes!"). The national security exception has, however, rarely been
used. See id. at 204-05. The United States used national security upon implementa-
tion of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 as a foundation to withdraw
MFN status from Czechoslovakia. The "contracting parties" adopted a declaration that
authorized the United States and Czechoslovakia to suspend GATT obligations and
benefits toward each other. See id. at 205.
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countries that could now threaten the United States's national
security interests are members of the WTO. The United States
accords these countries unconditional MFN status, which is a
requirement of the GATT and GATS.2 3 Therefore, if the Unit-
ed States was to put any of these countries into a classification
that gave them only conditional MFN and made them subject
to an annual review of their national security policy and prac-
tices, the United States would be in violation of its WTO com-
mitments and would have to terminate its recognition of these
countries under the WTO agreements."4
This is not to say that the United States could not withdraw
a country's unconditional MFN status. At any point, Congress
can pass legislation that terminates MFN status for a country
if it determines that such a termination is the most appropriate
tool to protect U.S. security interests. Congress should wait to
take action on a country's MFN status, however, until such
point that it needs to withdraw MFN status entirely rather
than putting a country into the conditional MFN status
classification, which merely keeps business relations unstable
and puts the United States at odds with its WTO commitments.
Besides reclassifying a country's MFN status or even revok-
ing MFN status, there are other tools, such as trade embargos
and foreign investment restrictions that could be used to ad-
dress national security threats. The proper tool to use is proba-
bly a decision that will have to be made on a case-by-case basis
because the landscape of trade and investment flow with the
United States is different for every country.
U.S. national security will be preserved best when the United
States clearly defines what its interests are,"' increases thesubstance of its diplomacy at the highest levels,256 builds alli-
253. See infra note 313 for an explanation of the WTO agreements' requirement of
unconditional MFN.
254. See infra note 313 for an explanation of the nonrecognition provision in the
WTO agreements.
255. President Ronald Reagan "was [able] to develop a foreign policy of extraor-
dinary consistency and relevance. Reagan might well have had only a few basic ideas,
but these also happened to be the core foreign policy issues of his period, which dem-
onstrates that a sense of direction and having the strength of one's convictions are
the key ingredients of leadership." HENRY KISSINGER, DipLoMAcY 765 (1994).
256. President Reagan knew that his meetings with President Gorbachev were
much more than symbolic gestures and fanfare. He intended to and was able to ad-
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ances in line with its vital interests,"' uses targeted legisla-
tion to address specifically any threats that may arise, or as a
last measure, uses military force.
B. Promotion of Foreign Policy Goals
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment is a "prototype of self-defeat-
ing policies in superpower relations."25 This assertion is sim-
ply incorrect. While the 1951 revocation of MFN targeted super-
power relations, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment had little to do
with the balance of power between the United States and the
Soviet Union. It is not a relic of the Cold War.
While MFN status was rescinded and the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment was passed during the Cold War, only the 1951
MFN recession was a national security tool during the Cold
War. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was a foreign policy tool
used to address Soviet domestic policy.
dress and resolve great issues of relevance and weight. Just before his first summit
with Gorbachev in 1985, President Reagan made these comments:
Starting with Brezhnev, I'd dreamed of personally going one-on-one with
a Soviet leader because I thought we might be able to accomplish things
our countries' diplomats couldn't do because they didn't have the authori-
ty. Putting that another way, I felt that if you got the top people negoti-
ating and talking at a summit and then the two of you came out arm in
arm saying, "We've agreed to this," the bureaucrats wouldn't be able to
louse up the agreement. Until Gorbachev, I never got an opportunity to
try out my idea. Now I had my chance.
Id. at 770-71.
257. For instance, President Rnald Reagan built relations based on U.S. national
interests:
The Reagan Administration achieved . . . successes by putting into prac-
tice what became known as the Reagan Doctrine: that the United States
would help anticommunist counterinsurgencies wrest their respective
countries out of the Soviet sphere of influence .... The high-flying
Wilsonian language in support of freedom and democracy globally was
leavened by an almost Machiavellian realism. America did not go "abroad
in search of monsters to destroy," in John Quincy Adams' memorable
phrase; rather, the Reagan Doctrine amounted to a strategy for helping
the enemy of one's enemy .... The United States had no more in com-
mon with the mujahideen than Richelieu had with the Sultan of the
Ottoman Empire. Yet they shared a common enemy, and in the world of
national interest, that made them allies.
Id. at 774-75.
258. Stevenson & Frye, supra note 209, at C2.
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The decision to evaluate only the emigration policies of the
Sino-Soviet bloc, however, is a relic of the Cold War. It is possi-
ble that there were no other countries in 1974 that significantly
restricted emigration. If there are countries that still signifi-
cantly restrict emigration today, there is not a rational reason
to apply Jackson-Vanik policy only to the former Sino-Soviet
bloc.
There is a practical reason, however, not to apply the Jack-
son-Vanik requirements to many other non-communist coun-
tries. If the United States decides, as a matter of U.S. policy, to
apply the Jackson-Vanik test to all countries, the President
would have to rescind MFN status or grant a waiver to those
countries without freedom of emigration. Many of these coun-
tries may already be members of the WTO, in which case, the
United States would have to terminate application of the WTO
multilateral trade agreements for these countries.259
Regardless of what tools the United States uses to affect the
emigration policies of other countries, the tools should be used
in a nondiscriminating manner. If the United States limited its
annual Jackson-Vanik review to the statutorily defined objec-
tives, it possibly could be kept in place with minimal disruption
of commercial relations.
A country's emigration is measurable. For instance, Senator
Jackson stated that the Soviet Union should at least reach a
certain objective benchmark by approving a specified amount of
emigration applications.26 There have been repeated efforts to
include a general discussion of human rights in the annual re-
newal process. There are universally recognized human rights
in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, and the
United States has better capabilities currently to monitor hu-
man rights violations in foreign countries than it had in the
1970s when an iron curtain masked such atrocities.
Several problems exist, however, with including a general
review of human rights in the Jackson-Vanik annual analysis.
First, the application of the U.N. standards on human rights is
subjective and is, therefore, interpreted differently by some U.S.
259. See infra note 299.
260. See supra note 122, 124.
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Congressmen. Some Congressmen may have a tendency to in-
terpret rights broadly to include what the United States consid-
ers civil rights. Also, the monitoring by the United States is not
readily available to U.S. businesses which have to determine in
which countries to operate. Finally, depending on the prevailing
public opinion in Congress, U.S. trading partners and the pri-
vate sector could be subject to an ever-changing standard.
Under Jackson-Vanik, to keep MFN status in effect for an
NME, the President must either make an additional finding of
compliance with the Jackson-Vanik requirements every six
months261 or grant an additional waiver of Jackson-Vanik ev-
ery year.262 Congress has the power within a specified time
period to override the President by a joint resolution.263 Thus,
there are many hurdles to jump in order for an NME to keep
its MFN status in effect.
Assuming the Jackson-Vanik Amendment ultimately has been
successful for Russia, as opposed to assuming that the increases
in the number of emigrants is attributable to something else, it
is possible that the policy should remain in place for other
countries. Congress has the authority to pass country-specific
legislation at any time and remove a country's MFN status for
any reason. This should be the correct procedure. The United
States could set objective standards as benchmarks for a
country's emigration policy. If the standards are not reached,
MFN status can be withdrawn until compliance occurs.
Countries would be targeted because of their actions. The stan-
dard would be clear, and the procedure would be less suscepti-
ble to multiple overrides.
In addition, the United States should use other available
tools, such as membership in international human rights refer-
enda, diplomacy at all levels, and the use of foreign aid to in-
fluence other countries' human rights practices." Both im-
261. See Trade Act of 1974, § 402(b), Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 2432(b) (1994)).
262. See id. at § 402(d) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d) (1994)).
263. See id. at § 402(d)(2) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2432(d)(2) (1994)).
264. See Cold War Trade Statutes Affecting U.S. Trade and Commercial Relations
with Russia and the Other Successor States of the Former Soviet Union, Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong. 19 (1993) (testimony of
Julian Spirer, Chair, American Jewish Congress). The United Nations has declara-
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proving relations, generally, and utilizing quiet diplomacy over
emigration issues, specifically, contributed to the changed emi-
gration policy of Russia.265 The value of a principled, consis-
tent diplomatic presence of the United States should not be
underestimated. This is a potentially strong tool for the execu-
tive branch to use.
C. Promoting U.S. Economic Goals
Title IV is not needed to protect national security interests
because Congress can pass specific legislation at any point to
withdraw the MFN status of countries that pose a threat to the
United States. In addition, Congress or the executive branch
can use other tools to protect U.S. security. Thus, if U.S. goals
for freedom of emigration can be pursued through country-spe-
cific legislation, which would be an avenue other than the Jack-
son-Vanik Amendment, then the amendment becomes irrelevant
legally because it does not address any other topics.
Without the Jackson-Vanik amendment to Title IV, the only
other part of the two-tier test for MFN status is the bilateral
trade agreement requirement. If the MFN bilateral trade agree-
ment and three-year renewal requirements were rescinded,
there would be some advantages, but the disadvantages would
likely outweigh the advantages.
Congress rescinded some Cold War statutes after they be-
came obsolete. For example, Congress repealed a provision in
the Trade Act of 1930, which addressed slave labor practices,
because the Soviet Union's political changes made the provision
tions and fora to address human rights, including emigration. See, e.g., Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A (EI), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N.
Doc. A1810 (1948). Additionally, in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope ("CSCE"), all parties have agreed to recognize the freedom of movement and
religion. Secretary of State James Baker, in the late 1980s, made it clear that consid-
ering the Soviet Union for a Jackson-Vanik waiver would be done in light of its com-
pliance with its commitments with such human rights commitments in the CSCE. He
noted further that U.S. participation in the CSCE Moscow conference would depend
on that country's performance. See Stevenson & Frye, supra note 209, at C2.
265. See Secretary of State Kissinger Calls for Early Passage of Trade Reform Act,
supra note 94, at 936 (stating that these tools were probably the reason for the rise
in emigration applications that were approved in the Soviet Union prior to the con-
sideration of the Trade Act of 1974).
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irrelevant. Congress has not rescinded other Cold War statutes,
such as a provision in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, that addressed the accession of NMEs that have
state trading practices to the WTO. The slave labor provisions
are trade related, but the latter affects trade directly. Further-
more, the latter is still relevant to some countries, albeit, per-
haps not the countries it was originally intended to target.266
One major advantage to rescinding Title IV completely would
be that U.S. businesses and their Chinese counterparts would
not be forced to make business decisions in a business climate
that could change dramatically. Consistency is important for
business relations. Once an agreement is in place, businesses
conclude contracts and make investments in reliance on the
agreement. The long-term and high-value nature of some con-
tracts make revocation of MFN status an undesirable policy.
Furthermore, due to the fact that there are few eligible buyers
in China for some industries, it is important for U.S. exporters
to have the ability to develop sufficient positive relationships.
There are, however, potential disadvantages to rescinding
Title IV. For one, because denial of MFN status is such a blunt
instrument, a threat of such denial is substantial leverage. For
instance, in 1991, President Bush used eroding support in Con-
gress for China's MFN renewal to influence Chinese leaders to
negotiate a memorandum of understanding on market access
that, if fully implemented, would greatly benefit both coun-
tries.267
266. See Cold War Trade Statutes Affecting U.S. Trade and Commercial Relations
with Russia and the Other Successor States of the Former Soviet Union, supra note
264, at 3. Testimony stated that the provision should be rescinded in part or at least
waived with regard to the FSU countries. See id. at 67-69 (statement of Terence P.
Stewart) (stating that the circumstances have changed since 1974, including: (1) the
breakup of the Soviet Union, making the statute's "'major' foreign countries" provision
possibly obsolete vis-a-vis the NIS; (2) the implementation of significant privatization
plans in the Soviet Union, making state trading less of a dominant force in the Sovi-
et market; (3) the renegotiation of the state trading enterprise article in the GATT,
making the multilateral arrangement more enforceable and the U.S. law less relevant
or needed; and (4) the provision arguing that recession of this provision would indi-
cate strong U.S. support for Russia's accession to GATT). Such a recession or waiver
for the NIS would send a clear message of support for Russia's membership in GATT.
See id. at 65.
267. See infra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
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The MFN bilateral trade agreement requirement should be
kept in place, but it needs to more clearly reflect current U.S.
economic goals. Furthermore, to add to its leverage and to help
promote U.S. economic interests abroad, the United States
could pursue sectoral bilateral negotiations that have some
measure of enforceability or broad multilateral negotiations.
1. A Title IV Agreement That Could Serve U.S. Economic
Goals
Congress should amend the Trade Act of 1974 to require
MFN bilateral trade agreements to reflect the substantial nego-
tiations that have continued through the last twenty years. In
the Trade Act of 1974, Congress attempted to ensure that trade
negotiators had sufficient flexibility but intended for the negoti-
ators to exercise such flexibility to obtain full reciprocity and
competitive opportunities for U.S. businesses. Specifically, Con-
gress established the three-year renewal requirement to ensure
that commercial agreements with NMEs were monitored and
adjusted as needed so that the United States would receive
benefits comparable to those it accords to its trading partners
and to ensure that NMEs would not be given a "free ride" on
the multilateral concessions the United States makes in connec-
tion with the GATT.2" It was important that the United
States receive mutual concessions on a continuing basis for
goods and services. With every presidential administration since
1975, the operation of Title IV, however, has proved that the
three-year renewal process has been one of "rubber-stamping"
agreements, regardless of how old the agreements.
Title IV should first be amended to lay out additional re-
quirements for any new bilateral MFN agreement that is nego-
tiated. This would be an amendment to section 40569 of the
Trade Act of 1974, which sets forth rather minimal require-
ments.27 Thus, the bulk of the amendment should set out ad-
268. See supra Part IV.A.2.
269. The six countries currently denied MFN status are North Korea, Vietnam,
Laos, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia. Vietnam and Laos are currently negotiating
an agreement with the United States.
270. See supra Part IA1.
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ditional required elements for bilateral agreements that extend
MFN status for the first time.2
If in fact the MFN bilateral trade agreements are "stepping-
stones" to WTO membership, as the United States Trade Repre-
sentative ("USTR") indicates,7 2 then the trade agreements
should reflect a majority of the principles in the WTO multilat-
eral agreements. Furthermore, they should incorporate certain
principles that are particularly applicable to NMEs.
Overall, the bill's requirements could reflect what the 1990s
MFN bilateral agreements already contain in addition to a few
new requirements to section 405. These new requirements could
include the following: (1) providing MFN treatment with respect
to those services for which that the GATS provides; (2) provid-
ing national treatment for the products of the other party; (3)
providing market access; (4) including a commitment, regarding
to goods and services, on transparency and on the procedures
for applying licensing standards; (5) ensuring that technical
standards are not used to create unnecessary obstacles to trade;
(6) making commitments to reduce barriers to trade in services;
(7) providing intellectual property protection adequate to protect
U.S. rights at a level similar to the level the United States has
agreed to in international conventions and multilateral agree-
ments; (8) including commitments on foreign investment; and
(9) disciplining unfair trade practices.
Some new additions to the section 405 requirements could
also address specific problems the United States has with
NMEs. For example, the requirements could include the follow-
ing: (1) eliminating any policy that requires, as a condition to
trade or investment, a company to make foreign direct invest-
ments, license its technology to a domestic company, or make
other collateral trade concessions; (2) providing that state trad-
ing enterprises must make purchases and sales in accordance
with commercial considerations consistent with the bilateral
agreement; (3) ensuring that there is adequate access to the
distribution system within the country so that foreign suppliers
271. See supra Part II.
272. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Joseph Damond, Director for Southeast Asia, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative).
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are able to reach the NME's consumers;273 and (4) making a
commitment that if the NME accedes to the WTO while the
United States still applies Title IV to that country, the NME
will accord to the United States concessions at least as favor-
able as it accords other WTO members. 4
The fourth provision regarding WTO accession in the amend-
ed section 405 would be particularly important to include in
China's new MFN agreement, and it could obtain the support of
U.S. businesses. It is neutral on its face, but it is drafted with
the anticipation that China may accede to the WTO without
permanent MFN status from the United States. If this happens,
then the bill would require China to give U.S. businesses rights
at least as favorable as those rights it gives to other WTO
members.
The amendment should require two things with regard to
agreements existing at the time of enactment of the changes.
Currently, the President can renew any agreement every three
years if he "determines" that the other country has sufficiently
reciprocated trade concessions. Thus, a publication requirement
and a reporting requirement should be added to section 405.
Furthermore, the amendment should void any agreement that
is 15 years old2  and require the President to renegotiate
those old agreements in accordance with the bill's substantive
amendments to section 405. None of the agreements, other than
China's, would be up for renegotiation until the year 2005 be-
cause all of them have been negotiated since 1990.
273. This third provision is necessary because the state trading enterprises in
some countries have liberalized while the country has simultaneously allowed there to
be monopolies on distribution.
274. See infra note 299.
275. China is the only country with MFN status that has a bilateral agreement
more than fifteen years old. China's agreement was renewed February 1, 1998. Under
the amendment to section 405, the U.S.-China agreement should not be terminated
automatically but should remain in place for one year in order to give the United
states and China time to renegotiate a new agreement. MFN status for the other 14
countries will be 15 years old on the following dates: in 2006, Mongolia; in 2007,
Albania and former Soviet Union ('FSU") countries (Russia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Ukraine); in 2008, FSU countries (Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
and Turkmenistan); in 2009, FSU country (Uzbekistan); and in 2010, FSU country
(Azerbaijan).
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2. Bilateral Sectoral Agreements With Enforceability
Regardless of whether Title IV is revoked, the United States
often has relied on bilateral agreements to address specific
problems as they arise. Some of these agreements have been
negotiated by the initiative of the executive branch without any
enacting legislation from Congress.
After the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, there were con-
gressional proposals in 1991 and 1992 to link renewal of
China's MFN waiver to improvements in four key areas of
trade. These areas included market access, intellectual property
rights ("IPR") protection, textile transshipments, and prison
labor exports.27 President Bush, however, vetoed a package of
conditions on China's MFN status stating, "[olur approach is
one of targeting specific areas of concern with the appropriate
policy instruments to produce the required results."77 As an
alternative, the President issued an action plan of specific steps
the administration would take to address the four key Chinese
practices.27
As promised in 1991, President Bush began negotiations on a
market access initiative. For a list of specified products,79
China agreed that it would eliminate restrictive licensing prac-
tices,"8 publish its trade laws,"' and adopt a scientific basis
276. See, for example, H.R. 2212, 102d Cong. (1992), which would have set addi-
tional conditions for China's MFN status extension, including specific improvements in
human rights practices, market access, IPR protection, and weapons proliferation, and
H.R. 5318, 102d Cong. (1992), which would have also applied similar conditions to
China's MFN renewal but would have denied MFN treatment, if the conditions were
not met, only to goods made by Chinese state-owned enterprises.
277. H.R. Doc. No. 102-197, at 1 (1992).
278. President Bush outlined the action plan in a letter to Senator Max Baucus.
Senator Baucus had originally written to the President urging him to take immediate
steps to address various trade, human rights, and weapons proliferation issues in
order to ensure extension of China's MFN status. See Letter from George Bush, Pres-
ident of the United States, to Max Baucus, United States Senator (July 19, 1991),
reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 26, 1991, at S-1 to S-3.
279. In the tariff schedule, these included, generally, the following product catego-
ries: agriculture, photographic products, chemicals, textiles, iron, steel, and machinery.
See Market Access Agreement, (1992), U.S.-P.R.G. Annex, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 16,
1992, at S-8 to S-10.
280. China agreed to "eliminate all import restrictions, quotas, licensing require-
ments, and controls for the product categories listed in the Annex." Id. at S-7.
281. China agreed to:
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for its sanitary and phytosanitary inspection requirements on
key agricultural commodities. 2 Furthermore, China asserted
that it does not have or will not have any import substitution
policies in place' and that it does not or will not make quan-
titative restrictions on automotive joint ventures' access to parts
or kits.' In return for these commitments, the United States
promised that it would "staunchly support GATT accession" if
China complied with the market access commitments." 5 Most
recently, however, the USTR reported that China has complied
only marginally with the licensing and transparency commit-
ments and has not complied with the commitment on scientific
standards.285 Furthermore, China announced an automotive
industrial policy in 1994. This policy includes import substitu-
tion requirements that explicitly call for the production of do-
mestic automobiles in substitute for imported ones, and it es-
tablishes local content requirements that force the use of do-
[Plublish on a regular and prompt basis all laws, regulations, rules, de-
crees, administrative guidance and policies pertaining to the classification
or valuation of products for customs purposes, or rates of duty, taxes or
other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports
or exports or the transfer of payments therefore, or affecting the sale,
distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing, inspection, exhibition,
processing, mixing or other use of imports or exports.
Id. at S-6. Only those laws which are "published and readily available to other gov-
ernments and foreign traders will be enforced." Id.
282. China committed to base all phytosanitary standards and testing requirements
on sound science and to administer them in a manner that does not impede or create
barriers to U.S. products. See id. at S-7. There was also a commitment in the agree-
ment to apply national treatment for testing and certification standards for non-agri-
cultural products. See id.
283. "The Chinese Government confirms that it has eliminatd all import substitu-
tion regulations, guidance and policies and will not subject any products to any im-
port substitution measures in the future." Id.
284. China made this commitment in a footnote to the Annex attached to the 1992
Market Access Agreement:
The Chinese Government also agrees that the operation of current and
future U.S. joint ventures in China in the production of motor vehicles
and parts will not be affected by quantitative restrictions on parts or kits
to be used by the joint ventures. Furthermore, such joint ventures will
be permitted to import parts and kits to expand production, including
expansion into new product lines.
Id. at S-10.
285. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1997 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 44-49 (1997).
286. See id.
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mestic component products regardless of whether they are com-
parable in price and quality to imported products.287
In addition to the Market Access Agreement, the administra-
tion held negotiations on intellectual property. Since 1991, how-
ever, the U.S.-China relationship has been dotted by a series of
special section 301 threats,2" subsequent agreements, and
some enforcement on the part of China.289
Similar to the intellectual property sector, the textile sector
has been subject to several threats from the United States,
ongoing negotiations between the two countries, and various
agreed terms. Several textile arrangements between the United
States and China have attempted to address on-going U.S.
concerns about market access and illegal transshipment
practices.29
The problem with most of these sector-specific trade agree-
ments initiated by the executive branch is that they do not
contain enforcement mechanisms within the agreements. There
are, however, legislative tools to enforce bilateral agreements
that do not have binding dispute resolution, but such tools
rarely have been used by the executive. One way that Congress
has been able to get the administration to enforce trade agree-
ments by use of targeted sanctions, as opposed to ending trade
relations across the board, is through the section 301 procedure.
When a foreign country fails to abide by its commitments in
a trade agreement, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows
the President to take retaliatory trade measures as a reme-
dy.291 Special section 301, for intellectual property protection,
requires the USTR to list a country as a "Priority Foreign
Country" if it has egregious practices, if it has significant ad-
verse impact on U.S. products, or if it is not negotiating in good
faith.292 The USTR must investigate the country's practices,
request the country to negotiate, and use sanctions if neces-
287. See id. at 48.
288. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994). See supra notes 283-87 and accompanying
text.
289. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 285, at 52-53.
290. See id. at 58-59.
291. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994).
292. See id. §§ 2411, 2414.
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sary" s When the USTR takes action, it can target a particu-
lar sector of the foreign country or it can retaliate broadly
across the entire market. 4
If a special 301 procedure was set up for NME countries that
are non-WTO members, it could be used for such countries
when they violate the terms of a bilateral trade agreement.295
The administration could do an annual report on the "Priority
Foreign Practices" of these countries. For instance, because
China has been violating its 1992 market access commitments
on its automobile industrial policy, the USTR could list this
action as a priority foreign practice and retaliation or negotia-
tions would be pursued.9 s Such a special 301 procedure would
be particularly useful because the United States does not have
recourse to the WTO's dispute settlement procedure; thus, uni-
lateral action is warranted. 7
3. Clearly Defined World Trade Organization Negotiations
The WTO accession process for Chiia, which has been on the
negotiating table since 1986, has outlined some much needed
concessions. In March 1993, the United States spelled out five
conditions that China must meet to gain U.S. support for its
application for accession. These conditions include:
a single national trade policy common to all Provinces and
regions of the country; full transparency of trade regula-
tions; the continuing gradual removal of nontariff import
barriers; a commitment to move to a full market economy;
and until the transition to a market economy is completed,
293. See id. § 2411.
294. The special 301 procedure has seen some success. In 1996, the administration
threatened sanctions against China because of its violation of the 1995 U.S.-China
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. In the month following the threats, China
immediately shut down 15 illegal compact disc factories and over 500 laser disc cine-
mas nationwide. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 285, at 52. Thereafter,
the Chinese closed nine additional factories and 28 illegal production disc facilities.
See id. at 53.
295. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
296. Most of section 301 contains the procedural steps the administration takes to
threaten sanctions. Special 301 simply requires the annual finding and requires the
Administration to use the section 301 procedures in the event the administration does
list a country as a priority.
297. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
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the acceptance of a safeguard system to protect GATT mem-
bers from possible surges in Chinese exports."'
In June 1994, the chair of the Working Party on China's
accession issued a report that listed the conditions that were
proposed by all of the members to the Working Party. 9 This
report became the foundation for a draft protocol on accession
in January 1995.300
In November 1995, the United States gave China a further
"road map" of key areas in which China had to make signifi-
cant concessions in order for the United States to support its
WTO membership. These included liberalization of trading
rights for Chinese firms, more rapid elimination of nontariff
barriers, reduction of price controls, phasing out of export subsi-
dies, and acceptance of safeguards."0 '
It seems apparent that the "carrot" of WTO membership is
not sufficient leverage to force the Chinese government to com-
mit at the appropriate level in order to make its trading system
compatible with GATT rules.02 China already obtains many of
the benefits of WTO membership because the MFN clause in
GATT applies nondiscriminatory treatment with respect to (1)
customs, duties, and charges imposed on imports and exports
and on international transfers of payments for imports and
exports; (2) the method of levying such duties and charges; (3)
all rules and formalities involving imports and exports; and (4)
internal taxation and regulation of products.0 3
298. The Year in Trade 1992: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, USITC
PUB. 2640, 85 n.289 (July 1993).
299. See GATT Working Party on China Focuses on Members' List of Demands, IN-
SIDE U.S. TRADE, July 1, 1994, at S-1 to -8. The report included many of the same
conditions the United States had initiated.
300. See Confidential Draft Protocol Proposes Unlimited China Safeguard, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Jan. 27, 1995, at S-1 to -12.
301. See Tony Walker, U.S. Map Puts China on Road to WTO, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1995, at 4.
302. Centrally planned commercial activity cannot be compatible with the rules of
GATT because GATT is a system based on market principles. See U.S. Dep't of
Comm., Reference Terms for Uruguay Round, BUS. AM., Nov. 23, 1987, at 21.
303. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex A,
33 I.L.M. 1154. Many of the other WTO agreements (e.g., Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, General Agreement on Trade in Services, and the Agreement on
Government Procurement) contain similar MFN obligations. Although, in some in-
stances, the members are allowed to take exception or reservation for particular sec-
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The MFN clause in the 1979 China Agreement also requires
nondiscriminatory treatment with respect to (1) customs, duties,
and charges; (2) customs processing; (3) internal taxes and
regulations; and (4) administrative formalities involving the
issuance of import and export licenses." 4 The United States
applies the MFN principle in the 1979 China Agreement in the
same way that the principle is applied under "similar circum-
stances under any multilateral trade agreement" to which ei-
ther party to the bilateral trade agreement is a party."5 By
law, the United States accords its multilaterally-negotiated
reduction in tariff rates and import restrictions to the products
of all foreign countries that have MFN status, regardless of the
agreement in which their MFN status is founded."6
By virtue of its MFN status, therefore, China has been a
"free rider" on the U.S. concessions that were made in the WTO
trade agreements, even though the MFN three-year renewal
procedure was intended to ensure that this did not happen.0 7
It is most apparent that China, as well as other NMEs that are
non-WTO members, values its MFN status highly. This may be,
therefore, the most effective leverage.
Additionally, Congress could outline negotiating objectives for
the accession of NMEs to the WTO. This could be a process
that now is used for the negotiation of multilateral and bilater-
al trade agreements.
In order to ensure that the United States pursues the policy
of free trade efficiently so that U.S. businesses can obtain tan-
gible benefits from the free trade policy, Congress and the ad-
ministration, following their respective constitutional powers
over international commerce and foreign affairs, instituted a
cooperative procedure for negotiating and implementing multi-
lateral trade agreements. With regard to U.S. multilateral and
bilateral trade agreements, the most common procedure is for
(1) Congress to set policy objectives; (2) the administration to
tors or activities.
304. See 1979 China Agreement, supra note 130, at 4653-54.
305. Id. at 4654.
306. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amend-
ed at 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a) (1994)); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794,
76 Stat. 878 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1994)).
307. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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exercise its discretion in obtaining concessions from other coun-
tries during negotiations that are in line with Congressional
objectives but that are reasonable at the time; (3) the adminis-
tration to submit a report to Congress identifying which objec-
tives were met; °5 and (4) Congress then to approve the con-
cluded agreement within a relatively short time even though all
of the objectives were not met and to enact implementing legis-
lation. °9
Once this process is complete, the agreement is implemented
legislatively, then the only action left may be rulemaking with-
in agencies. This legislative process has been used successfully
for the negotiation, approval, and implementation of almost all
of the United States's multilateral trade agreements31 and its
free trade area ("FTA") agreements.31' This implementation
process normally will not extend beyond a few months from the
time the President submits an agreement to Congress and a
308. For example, in 1988, Congress set a negotiating objective to develop rules to
address large and persistent global current account surpluses. Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. § 2901(5) (1994). This objective, however, was not achieved in the Uruguay
Round negotiations. Thus, this becomes part of the USTR's Statement of Adminis-
trative Action, which is a report from the administration to Congress of what was
achieved from Uruguay Rounds based on the 1988 OTCA negotiating objectives. See
H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1134 (1994) (stating how the Uruguay Round Agreements
achieve congressional negotiating objectives).
309. For example, the trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round, April 12-15, 1994,
in Marrakesh, Morocco, ended with the adoption of four decisions. Final Act Embody-
ing the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M 1140; Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1154; Marrakesh Declaration, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1263; Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144. Those agree-
ments that had not been approved already by Congress were approved that year, and
the implementing legislation was passed. See H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 (1994).
310. Congress and the administration have used this process for multilateral nego-
tiations of the WTO multilateral trade agreements. In the Trade Act of 1974, Con-
gress outlined negotiating objectives that were used for the Tokyo Round. See 19
U.S.C. §§ 2114, 2116-2118, 2131 (1974). In the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 ("OTCA"), Congress updated its objectives, which were used by the ad-
ministration in the most recent negotiations of the Uruguay Round. See 19 U.S.C. §§
2901(b), 3501-3624 (1994). The Uruguay Round of Negotiations, 1986-1994, institu-
tionalized the World Trade Organization, authenticated a "package" of Multilateral
Trade Agreements, and ushered "in a new era of global economic cooperation [for
dispute settlement that reflects] the widespread desire to operate in a fairer and
more open multilateral trading system." Marrakesh Declaration, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1263.
311. These include the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, the North American
Free Trade Agreement, and the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement.
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few months from the time Congress approves an agreement. 12
Most trade agreements, once signed by the President and
passed by Congress, go into effect within a relatively short
period of time and with little shared jurisdiction by the execu-
tive and legislative branches.
If Congress set up WTO accession negotiating objectives, the
executive could report on how those objectives were met, and
Congress could then cast its vote for or against unconditional
MFN status313 based on whether these objectives had been
achieved. One may argue, however, that the approach could tie
the hands of the negotiators. This same argument could be
made, though, with even greater force in the multilateral con-
text where Congress is setting the objectives for future rounds
of negotiations. Congressionally set negotiating objectives have
not, however, presented insurmountable challenges either in the
negotiation or implementation stages for agreements.
The advantage to WTO accession objectives is that the Ad-
ministration could use this anticipated vote on unconditional
MFN status as leverage to obtain the concessions the United
States needs in order to protect its economic interests. Congress
would be backing the executive's negotiating position. Also, it
may ensure that past rounds of negotiations for the GATT and
WTO are not diluted by a country such as China entering the
WTO at a level that is not compatible with concessions already
made by WTO members.
312. Normally, to approve a completed agreement, Congress uses the "fast track"
procedure, which is a suspension of Congressional procedure rules. The effect is to
give the President a guarantee that if he has complied with consultation require-
ments for Congress during the course of the negotiation of the agreement and if he
has negotiated the agreement in line with Congressional negotiating objectives, he
will be able to submit a trade agreement to Congress with out the threat of a filibus-
ter, with deadlines for votes, and with limited amendments (i.e., an up-or-down vote
on the agreement).
313. The United States is required to grant a country unconditional MFN status
before it can recognize that country's WTO membership. If unconditional MFN status
was not passed by Congress for a country under Title IV that obtains WTO member-
ship, the United States would have to invoke Article XII, the non-application article
of the WTO, because the MFN commitment in GATT requires that countries accord
immediately and unconditionally to goods of any other members treatment no less
favorable than that it accords to like goods and services of any other country. See
GATT, supra note 3, 61 Stat. at A12 to A13, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-200.
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VII. CONCLUSION
U.S. security interests do not need an annual expiration or
evaluation of conditional MFN status in order to be protected.
Title IV countries, as well as non-Title IV countries, should be
evaluated based on their own merits or threats. If Congress or
the administration determines at any given time that it is nec-
essary to withdraw MFN status for national security reasons,
the two branches should do so. Furthermore, if MFN status is
restored, it should be restored unconditionally.
Human rights protection should be pursued through channels
other than the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The provision is still
useful, however, for purposes of U.S. emigration policy if there
are countries that significantly limit emigration rights. The
United States should, however, set measurable objectives, and if
the objectives are met and maintained, unconditional MFN
status should not be withheld.
The stakes for U.S. economic interests are much higher now
than they were in the 1970s. After the conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round and the "packaging" of the multilateral trade
agreements under the umbrella of the WTO, countries world-
wide are held to a higher standard of trade in sectors across
the board.
Because the current administration's record tends to focus on
new consensus when conflicts arise instead of enforcement of
prior commitments, a special 301 for NME sectoral agreements
is desirable. "[Wiords we can only applaud. But a new relation-
ship cannot be simply declared .... It must be earned because
promises are never enough." 14 Discretion would still lie with
the President, however, in making "priority practice" determina-
tions, as would be required by a section 301 proceeding, and in
choosing the potential sanctions.
President Bush stated, "we seek the integration of the Soviet
Union into the community of nations ... as they meet the
challenge of responsible international behavior-we match their
314. President George Bush, Address at the Texas A&M University Commencement
Service (May 12, 1989), in 135 CONG. REC. 5259 (daily ed. May 12, 1989).
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steps with steps of our own."315 This same rationale should be
applied to the economic aspects of the United States's relation-
ship with NMEs, especially with China, which is an increasing-
ly important market for the United States. China's promises
and assurances are not enough. Economic relations at the
highest diplomatic level have appreciable impacts on private
contractual relations. Stability is too important to U.S. busi-
nesses for U.S. diplomats to change the standard of cooperation
or to rely on assurances that are unimplemented and untested.
The best trade and investment relations are those relations
that can be successfully negotiated, that are sufficiently sub-
stantive, and that can be adequately enforced. The United
States and China should strive for no less.
A past administration stated that the U.S.-Romania Trade
Agreement is "a critical element" of the U.S. economic policy
toward Romania.316 That is possibly why the State Depart-
ment considered it necessary to update the agreement in 1992.
The current administration has said that the Vietnam Bilateral
Trade Agreement, now being negotiated, could be a solid step-
ping stone to Vietnam's WTO accession.317 Any trade agree-
ment that is twenty years old is outdated and virtually nonexis-
tent. It is merely a pebble in a swift stream of trade. The Unit-
ed States can no longer afford to have the executive "rubber-
stamping" outdated bilateral agreements which are critical for
purposes of U.S. bilateral MFN relations and for purposes of
the promotion of countries' accession to the WTO. In both of
these respects, it is essential that China's bilateral agreement
is updated, especially because of the size and growth rates of
China's economy and the potential impacts on U.S. trade flows.
Currently, the United States maintains the position that it
will not negotiate in multiple fora simultaneously. For instance,
it appears that the administration would rather rely on the
ongoing WTO negotiations then to pursue bilateral MFN negoti-
315. Id.
316. See Continuing Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment of Imports from Roma-
nia: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance,
94th Cong. 37 (1976) (statement of Gerald L. Parsky, Assistant Secretary, Dep't of
the Treasury).
317. See Damond, supra note 272.
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ations with China while working on a multilaterally negotiated
WTO accession package for China. 18 Furthermore, it has been
stated that to begin MFN bilateral negotiations with China
would show a lack of confidence in the WTO accession process.
By negotiating in multiple fora, however, the United States
demonstrates to China that it is an important trade partner,
and it demonstrates to U.S. businesses that their substantive
rights will be secured regardless of outcomes in different
fora.3 1
9
Using multiple fora and new procedures outlined for Title IV
to promote both national security and trade benefits, unlike
those legislative options that pit one interest against another in
an all-or-nothing procedure such as MFN termination, could
increase trade benefits for the United States while preserving
U.S. national security interests and promoting human rights
abroad.
318. See generally Emerging Trade Issues with Asia, Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Com., Science, and Transp., 104th Cong. (1997).
319. The importance of negotiating in multiple fora can be considered in light of
an example a debtor-creditor law professor gave when trying to instruct his students
about filing judgment liens in multiple counties:
"In how many counties do we need to file a lien?" one student asked.
"I went to the doctor once with a cold," the professor explained. "Really, all
you need,' the doctor told me, is to take Vitamin C.' 'How much?' I asked. 'All you
can afford." Professor Robert Laurence, Remarks at University of Arkansas School of
Law (1995).
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